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 of dualism. The dissolution of Austria is a natural and necessary historical process.

29. The Pangerman politicians of Austria plan to strengthen Austria by making it smaller. To give up Trentino to Italy, to surrender, if necessary, Bukovina, a part, or even the whole, of Galicia, would not, according to their scheme, make Austria weaker; it would cease to be in opposition to Italy, Poland would be under Austrian and German influence, and a territorial indemnity would be found for ceded territory in the Balkans and in Russia (Ukraina!). The restoration of the small, weakened Serbia would not, for some time, be in the way of the plan to unify the Jugoslavs under Austria, and in that way to occupy the Balkans. These plans are purely Pangermanist. The Pangermans, even Schoenerer himself, have long ago demanded the separation of Galicia and Dalmatia—which would give the Germans a secure majority in the parliament against the Czechs, who are the greatest and the most powerful obstacle to the Pangerman plans.

30. Many imagine that Austria was driven into the war by Germany against its will, and that after the war it will be opposed to Germany. That is a misreading of history; Austria from its inception served the German ideal; the German publicists of Austria (for instance, the above quoted Mueller) understand that very well—a little freedom conceded to the Slavs will not hinder Germanization through ideas. Germanization is possible even by means of the Slav tongues; and the rivalry with Prussia, as we have shown, actually strengthened in Prussia and in Austria the German ideal, until Bismarck finally found the definite formula for the organisation of Pangerman aggression.

In addition to that, the Magyars have delivered themselves to Germany hand and foot, as is constantly declared not merely by Tisza but also by Andrássy, Karolyi, and all the others. Vienna and Budapest will not be anti-German. Neither are the speculations based on the differences of church and religion well founded. Germany occupied Austria politically, the Catholics in Germany will occupy her ecclesiastically; they well know that Austrian Catholicism is a mire—it was termed so expressly by the Catholic organ of Cologne—but the Jesuits of Cologne and Rome do not mind it; on the contrary, that will make Vienna the more subservient and the Centrum in Germany will get the political leadership of the Austrian weaklings. The Prussia of Frederick and Bismarck is no whit better, as far as Jesuitism goes, than the Centrum at Vienna. The policy of Austria, aiming only to preserve the dynastic prestige, is always contented with appearances; Berlin very cleverly complies with Vienna’s wishes and does not worry if the Habsburgs maintain the appearance of independence and even primacy. It does not, for instance, matter to Berlin that Vienna proceeds in a different manner in the Polish question; Berlin does not care that Austrian agents, especially in America and England, intimate that Austria is opposed to Berlin, that it was dragged into the war, that it has had enough of war, etc.; in reality Austria is not opposed to Berlin, but accepts all that Berlin considers necessary. And if Vienna sometimes really goes its own way, even that does not bother Berlin in the end—Berlin and Vienna are like the Siamese twins. Their co-operation in the main direction is best illustrated by this war: the war was provoked by Austria and its false anti-Serbian and anti-Slav policy; Germany used the opportunity to give her ally carte blanche, and in this way, being well prepared and desirous of war, she tried to conceal her complicity under the guise of faithfulness to her ally.