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 And it is equally clear why militaristic monarchies of the mediæval type, why Prussia-Germany, Austria and Turkey (Ferdinand of Bulgaria fits in well with this trinity) oppose the principle of nationality, placing the state above the nation and arguing from their narrow etatism, that the Allies have no business to interfere in the “internal” affairs of their states.

The self-determination of nations cannot, of course, be realised as long as this pharisaic principle is respected. A great German newspaper declared the slaughter of the Armenians to be an “internal” affair of Turkey. The oppression of Slavs, Roumanians, and Italians in Austro-Hungary is also claimed to be an internal affair, and so is the cultural murder of the Poles in Prussia. And yet these “internal affairs” gave rise to the present “outward” world-war.

By the Allies’ note to President Wilson questions of nationality became international questions. The question of Belgium, Serbia and the Jugoslavs in general; of Alsace-Lorraine; of the Danes and of Schleswig; of the Italians, Roumanians, Czecho-Slovaks, and Slavs in general in Austria-Hungary, and those of the Poles are international problems, problems of Europe and humanity. Pangermanists, of course, deride now all humanitarian ideals, even though they have been proclaimed by the greatest and best Germans; one of their prominent leaders, Professor Haase, declares expressly that love for one’s neighbour can exist only as between individuals, but cannot be at all thought of as between nations. On this moral foundation the Pangermanists formulate their aggressive, purely militaristic demands: the Germans must arrange their frontiers—the Germans must provide bread for their growing population—the Germans are surrounded by foreign nations, and therefore they must be militarists, etc. As if other nations likewise did not have unfavourable frontiers or were not surrounded by foreigners, as, for instance, we, the Czechs, or do not have to provide for food—no, it is either Kant or Bismarck, either Schiller or William, either Lessing or Bernhardi! Czar William constantly appeals to God and declares himself to be God’s instrument—to Jesus, of course, he does not appeal; this Prussian Jahve is in reality the political power of a state-recognised and privileged church which gives to the Czar and his state a pastor for each village as God’s gendarme. It has been stated above that European states are still theocratic, therefore democracy everywhere is opposed to the state and the church; democracy has a human foundation, and not a divine foundation in the theocratic sense; it has its foundation in morality, not in official religion. Only in so far as morality—love for one another—is hallowed by true, pure, non-political religion, does democracy recognise politics subspecie aeternitatis. Such politics is possible on the basis of the teachings of Jesus and of his two great commandments, and only on that basis.

16. The definition and significance of Great Powers has changed much in recent years; fewer Great Powers are now recognised, old ones step aside, new ones take their places. The standard of greatness has become relative by the growth of the population. The Pangermanists recognise only three, at most four, Great Powers in Europe—Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and perhaps France; many will not recognise even France for a Great Power. Those who emphasise the previously mentioned natural weaknesses of Russia (the contrast of the inadequate number of the population with the vast uncultured territory, etc.) speak only of two Great Powers, Germany and Great Britain; from this point of view frequently