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 has been exposed by Dr. Friedjung, the well-known Austrian historian, in his valuable work, "Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859–1866" ("The Struggle for Predominance in Germany, 1859–1866"). In this book he explained the significance, from the German point of view, of Austria's defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866, and advocated a close union between the two countries. The same Dr. Friedjung, by the Nemesis of history, was implicated in the sordid forgeries with which the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade provided Count Aehrenthal—those forged documents which were intended to prove the existence of Serbian propaganda in Austria-Hungary, and thus to establish a case for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the war, one of the leaders of Austrian Pangermanism, the Deputy Iro, has published his programme in the pamphlet ("Oesterreich nach dem Kriege") mentioned in a previous article (No. 1). I may add here that this official conversion to Bismarckian tactics was not allowed to be discussed in the Bohemian papers. Like all Pangerman schemes, Herr Iro's plan aims, in the first instance, at crushing Bohemia as the foremost obstacle to Pangermanism.

The newest scheme, which may be described without exaggeration as the philosophy of Austrian Pangermanism, has been formulated by Robert Mueller in his books. "Was erwartet Oesterreich von seinem jungen Thronfolger?" (1915) ("What does Austria expect from her young Heir Apparent?"), and "Oesterreich und der Mensch" (1916). The author belongs to the "Jung-Oesterreich" party, and advocates the plans of Francis Ferdinand. The establishment of a "Gross Oesterreich" would create a trustworthy ally for Germany-Prussia, which would act as a vanguard in the Balkans, and which would extend its operations even as far as Asia Minor. "To the Mediterranean!" and "Gross-Oesterreich oder das Nichts!" are the foremost watchwords of the Pangerman movement in Austria. That movement aims at the absorption of all the Serbian territories, and it is doubtful if the needs of "Gross-Oesterreich" will even be satisfied with that comprehensive "Raubkampf." Müller, it may be noted, rather emphasises the differences between Austrian and Prussian mentality, but these differences can never endanger the close unity of the two Pangermanic States which are animated by the same motives. In view of this unity, it is remarkable that Müller should consider