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xviii vices to which it is doomed to be subject — Man's liability to disease is with him a blemish in the economy of nature: — "life," he says, "this gift of nature, however long it may be, is but too uncertain and too frail; to those even to whom it is most largely granted, it is dealt out with a sparing and niggardly hand, If we only think of eternity ." As we cannot have life on our own terms, he does not think it worthy of our acceptance, and more than once expresses his opinion that the sooner we are rid of it the better. Sudden death he looks upon as a remarkable phenomenon, but, at the same time, as the greatest blessing that can be granted to us : and when he mentions cases of resuscitation, it is only to indulge in the querulous complaint, that, "exposed as he is by his birth to the caprices of fortune, man can be certain of nothing; no, not even his own death ."" Though anything but an Epicurean, in the modern acceptation of the word, he seems to have held some, at least, of the tenets of Epicurus, in reference to the immortality of the soul. Whether he supposed that the soul, at the moment of death, is resolved into its previous atoms or constituent elements, he does not inform us; but he states it as his belief, that after death the soul has no more existence than it had before birth; that all notions of immortality are a mere delusion ; and that the very idea of a future existence is ridiculous, and spoils that greatest blessing of nature — death. He certainly speaks of ghosts or apparitions, seen after death; but these he probably looked upon as exceptional cases, if indeed he believed in the stories which he quotes, of which we have no proofs, or rather, indeed, presumptive proofs to the contrary; for some of them he calls "magna fabulosetas," "most fabulous tales."

In relation to human inventions, it is worthy of remark,