Page:The Mediaeval Mind Vol 2.djvu/321

CHAP. XXXIV is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (i.e. comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine says in the Enchiridion: 'Although those things which are evils, in so far as they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (bonum) that there should be not only goods (bona) but evils.' Therefore God wills evils."

"(2) Moreover [Praeterea, Thomas's regular formula for introducing the succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap. de divinis nominibus: 'There will be evil making for the perfection of the whole.' And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: 'Out of all (things) the admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly; since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared with evil.' But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation. Therefore God wills evils."

"(3) Moreover, the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils (mala fieri, et non fieri) are contradictory opposites. But God does not will evils not to occur; because since some evils do occur, the will of God would not be fulfilled. Therefore God wills evils to occur."

"Sed contra est [Thomas's formula for stating the opinion which he will approve] what Augustine says in his book of Eighty-three Questions: 'No wise man is the author of man's deterioration; yet God is more excellent than any wise man; much less then, is God the author of any one's deterioration. But He is said to be the author when He is spoken of as willing anything. Therefore man becomes worse, God not willing it. But with every evil, something becomes worse. Therefore God does not will evils."

"Respondeo dicendum quod [Thomas's formula for commencing his elucidation] since the reason (or ground or cause, ratio) of the good is likewise the reason of the desirable (as discussed previously), evil is opposed to good: it is impossible that any evil, as evil, should be desired, either by the natural appetite or the animal, or the intellectual, which is will. But some evil may be desired per accidens, in so far as it conduces to some good. And this is apparent in any appetite. For the natural impulse (agens naturale) does not aim at privation or destruction (corruptio); but at form, to which the privation of another form may be joined (i.e. needed, conjungitur); and at the generation of one, which is the destruction of another. Thus a lion, killing a stag, aims at food, to which is joined the killing of an animal. Likewise the fornicator aims at enjoyment, to which is joined the deformity of guilt.

"Thus evil which is joined to some good, is privation of another good. Never, therefore, is evil desired, not even per accidens, unless the good to which the evil is joined appears greater than the good which is annulled through the evil. But God wills no good more than His goodness; yet He wills some one good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt, which destroys relationship to divine good (quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum), God in no way wills. But the evil of natural defect, or the evil of penalty, He wills in willing some good to which such evil is joined; as, in willing righteousness He wills penalty; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills certain natural corruptions.

"Ad primum ergo dicendum [Thomas's formula for commencing his reply to the first false argument] that certain ones have said that although God does not will evils, He wills evils to be or become : because, although evils are not goods, yet it is good that evils should be or become. They said this for the reason that those things which are evil in themselves, are ordained for some good; and they deemed this ordainment involved in saying mala esse vel fieri. But that is not said rightly. Because evil is not ordained for good per se but per accidens. For it is beyond the sinner's intent, that good should come of it; just as it was beyond the intent of the tyrants that from their persecutions the