Page:The Limits of Evolution (1904).djvu/489

428 whole problem of epistemology. This would need to be taken up along Kant’s own lines, and followed to the point where (at the end of the Transcendental Analytic) one gets into the position to show that Kant has failed to establish the objective character of even natural science, and just why he has failed. It would then appear that in order to give really objective value to a priori syntheses in Space and Time, we must combine a pure use of the Categories — a use unmixed with the Sense-Forms — with their use as “schematised” with the help of these Forms. Thus we should learn that there is no possible escape from the transcendent use of the Categories, even when we attempt to employ them only transcendentally.

But not only did I feel that this epistemological inquiry was at once too long and too subtle for the public to which I chiefly addressed my book; I was also, in the case of more expert readers, relying upon a previous warning as to the general path the inquiry must follow, which I had given in my contribution to the volume entitled The Conception of God, at pp. 124-127. Still, Mr. McTaggart is quite right in pointing out that all this needs to be done in full detail before one can claim to have made a proof of Personal Idealism clear of all queries. And this I hope some day yet to accomplish.

(3) My reviewer finds a “weakness” in that part of my argument concerning the existence of God which aims at showing God’s soleness (monotheism), in opposition to the charge of “polytheism” or “apeirotheism” urged against my proposition that all selves coexist with God in eternity. He thinks the argument assumes “that beings who were equally perfect could not be different from one another.” But it does not assume this, as I have already shown above, when clearing up the misapprehension about perfection and imperfection as applicable to the selves other than God. It does assume, however, that no beings who are absolutely