Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/73

 of arming the workers; from the first moment of their participation in the Workers' Government, the Communists should have known no other basic principle but the arming of the proletariat.

It was further their duty to unfold before the masses their proletarian programme for saving the country, and to carry on an energetic propaganda for the political workers' councils, and thereby to counteract the sabotage of the Left socialist ministers. It was their duty to work in Parliament and in the factory councils for the immediate adoption of the revolutionary measures such as the confiscation of the enterprises of manufactures who were sabotaging production, and the requisition of the houses of rich families for homeless workers and their children.

It was also the duty of the Communists from the first moment of their participation in the government to brand in the eyes of the masses the double-dealing policy of Zeigner, his secret negotiations with the military dictators, as well as the whole counter-revolutionary rôle of the left social democratic leaders.

Owing to this negligence, and to the fact that the Party was not capable of mobilising the masses, the Saxon experiment failed to mark a forward move in the fight: instead of revolutionary strategy we had a non-revolutionary parliamentary co-operation with the "left" social democrats. The special assertion of the Communist ministers that they were responsible only to the Landtag and to the constitution, was scarcely suited to destroy democratic illusions.

The Chemnitz Conference could have been a success for the Party only if adequate revolutionary work had been undertaken by all the Party bodies. The Party allowed itself to be caught unprepared by the thrust of the enemy, the Reich-executive which everyone foresaw. The greater therefore was the error that, although the general strike was to be proposed, no attempt was made to concentrate the conference from the moment of its opening exclusively on the question of defence against the Reich-executive. These were errors, which undoubtedly facilitated the treacherous game of the Left social democratic leaders.

A direct contrast to Saxony was the uprising in Hamburg. Here it was proved that a bold surprise attack of determined fighters could smash the enemy militarily. But it also showed that such an armed struggle, even though, as was the case in Hamburg, it is regarded by the population not without sympathy and is supported by a mass movement, is nevertheless doomed to failure if it remains isolated and is not supported on the spot by a workers' council movement, the absence of which was severely felt in Hamburg.

The fight itself in the Reich was hampered by contradictory orders issued by the centre, and the strike movements which were actually taking place, suffered from lack of news of the fight in