Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/34

 his activities there so as to carry out the tactic of the united front from beginning to end, as he imagined.

I should like to take the example of the Chemnitz Conference. When a responsible politician sees that the Party is faced with an immediate armed struggle he must attempt to prepare the masses ideologically for it. The Party cannot be led into an armed conflict unless the masses are ideologically prepared for it.

At Chemnitz, however, it was intended to discuss economic industrial questions and not to call upon and mobilise the masses for the fight. When Graupe, at the moment of the civil war, declared that the masses could not be called upon to fight then but later, his method was the same as that employed by Brandler. At the decisive moment they declined because they cherished the theory of a constitutional transition from the Workers' Government to the paradise of Socialism.

The Hamburg fight is a proof that the Party, even as a minority, can win the masses for the fight, that it is not necessary to take up the ground of Social Democracy in order to secure an adequate relation of forces. I can hardly describe to you how the Hamburg fight affected the working class in Berlin. When the news reached Berlin that the Hamburg workers were fighting weapon in hand, the Berlin workers were moved, but they hardly reacted at all to the Saxon question. That shows that we shall win the workers for the struggle and be able to mobilise them if we have the courage as a Communist Party to enter the fight even without the Social-Democrats. This lesson of the Hamburg fight leads us back to the same problem of the German revolution, namely, that we must win over the masses.

There are two answers.

Shall we win the masses by wrapping ourselves in the cloak of Social Democracy by appearing to be constitutional? Or shall we win them by showing a clear Communist face, by acting as a Communist Party, and by displaying a clear Communist practice and theory.

Comrades, I say that only when we remember that we have made it easy for the Social-Democratic workers to remain in the Social-Democratic Party can we conceive what the present strength of the United Socialist Party of Germany is. The Left Social-Democratic workers who were beginning to understand that the Social-Democratic Party was a bad party, we have by our united front tactic, again united to their party.

I am of the opinion that the workers will be gradually driven towards Communism if our Party stands forth boldly and conscious of its aim, and by the strength of the International. If, however, we offer the Left Social-Democratic workers the outlet of the united front, then even the dissatisfied Social-Democratic workers will remain with the S.P.G. The talk about the split of the