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 drawn up in conjunction with the Executive Committee. If we want to learn, we must criticise the false plan and its mistaken realisation. The great error which resulted in a depression of a part of the working class masses, we considered only one possible form of struggle, namely, the fight for the proletarian power; had only the dictatorship of the proletariat in mind and no other situation. Therefore we were unable to direct the retreat successfully, and could offer no resistance, as we did during the Cuno strike. Had we not staked all or nothing, we might have undertaken a defensive action, which, of course, would not have ended in victory but would certainly have saved us from decisive defeat. The representative of the Executive in his report stated that comrades during the defeat declared that it was undertaken without a fight. That is not true. From the very first we conducted retiring actions—demonstrations and strikes—and in the very first circulars and instructions. The Party did not act so rapidly. By its victory without a fight Fascism temporarily greatly affected the influence of the Communist Party over the masses. We were consequently not in a position to resist Fascism, to place the Party on an illegal basis, and to take up the struggle anew. It is for this and not a false tactic in the past we have to thank the defeat of October. In the circumstances which existed in 1921 during the March action, I declare that if the decision again lay with me I would pursue the same policy and tactics. No other policy was possible. What the comrades of the opposition desire will lead to the enfeeblement of the German revolution, in spite of their burning love for revolutionary fights, expressed by Thälmann. Speeches such as Thälmann made are easy, but if you are unable to rally the masses, you will be unable to carry out the tasks you set yourself. If we can bring the masses into the struggle, then in the struggle we shall overcome our weaknesses. By increasing our aims and intensifying the struggle we shall be able to secure victory. This time the necessary pre-requisites were lacking. In common with the Executive Committee, we over-estimated our strength and underestimated the strength of the enemy. We were therefore compelled to retreat.

In conclusion let me deal with the prospects for the future.

As far as they are concerned, there are no great differences between us and the opposition. Victory has placed State power completely into the hands of the Fascists. As far as it still tolerates the November Republic, Fascism may either embellish it or abolish it as it wishes. The Fascist dictatorship rests upon the alliance between industry and the agrarians. They can keep the proletariat under for some length of time, and give Fascism a breathing space only if they succeed: (1) in emerging from financial bankruptcy: (2) in winning over and subordinating petty-bourgeoisie Fascism by repressions and concessions: and (3) in splitting the working class by maintaining the appearance of democracy using the Social-Democrats as auxiliary troops, using repressive measures