Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/21

 them? By taking the Social-Democratic workers by the scruff of the neck, by destroying their illusions with facts. Their hopes for an easy path were destroyed by practice and in the course of events.

A rising revolutionary wave began. We saw only one side of it—its good side. What was the Cuno strike? The Cuno strike was in Berlin nothing but a continuation of the revolutionary wages fights in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia, and Saxony. But such a fight in Berlin has an entirely different political significance from a fight in the Ruhr, in Saxony, or in Upper Silesia. The strike took place during a Government crisis and precipitated the fall of the Cuno Government, But, comrades. it: was only a political strike in its effects and in the given situation. In the sense of a conscious revolutionary aim, the Cuno strike was not a political strike, it had no elemental force behind it.

Serious preparations for civil war were begun by the Party in many, in fact in nearly all places, only after the manifesto of July 11. This inadequate preparation was due to objective weaknesses, since the anti-Fascist Day, with its tremendous possibilities for agitation among the petty-bourgeoisie and the workers, created a situation in which it was almost universally believed that on the 29th the Communists would begin the attack.

There were signs of a rising revolutionary movement. We had temporarily the majority of the workers behind us, and in this situation believed that under favourable circumstances we could proceed immediately to attack. In my opinion we were mistaken. The unfortunate thing was that we over-estimated the fighting power of the majority in the Ruhr, in Saxony, and in Berlin, we could not organise it and consolidate it. As we grew stronger the Government retaliated, It retaliated by prohibiting the Factory Councils.

This situation, which was pregnant of any possibility, we as the Communist Party were unable to drive forward into a storm attack, as we have imagined. And I believe—I must say this quite plainly and bluntly—that had we, as Radek states, recognised this then, and had we in good time, as a Party and as an Executive, taken the necessary, measures, had we begun the decisive fight, then the final victory perhaps may not have come in October, but certainly we should not have suffered the defeat we did suffer during the retreat. When we undertook to take advantage of the favourable situation in Central Germany and Saxony for a storm attack against the bourgeoisie, we overlooked the fact that the enemy had already long had the initiative, and that we were unable when the enemy struck first and took the offensive to organise serious resistance.

If I had not wasted the time at my disposal for my report by a too lengthy introduction I should proceed to point out what made the attack of the enemy easy, and how we duped ourselves,