Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/20

 Silesia the same; only in Saxony did we go a shade further: there we were entrusted with the leadership of the political struggle on the question of taking advantage of the existing parliamentary situation.

Comrades, I do not want to deny any blame; I am an exponent of the policy of the Party since Leipsic and of the Saxon policy. But, comrades, it would be absurd, it would be entirely over-estimating my capacities, strength, and influence, to suggest that I was able to force a false political policy upon the whole Party. What is then in dispute? The quite definite circumstances under which we undertook the struggle. And what were these circumstances? In Saxony we forced the dissolution of the Landtag; we had a proletarian majority in the Landtag. Had we declared, as the opposition demanded, that the proletarian majority did not interest us in the least, that we would not attempt to make use of it, then I say, we should have become a sect not only in Saxony but also in the whole of Germany. We had to take up the struggle in the situation which then existed, with all its good sides and all its bad sides. Mistakes were made. The force of the attack and the impulse of the Party should have been stronger; greater advantages should have been obtained; but the decisive factor is not the great or small mistakes that we made, but the given conditions for the fight of which we had to make use. And what use had we to make of them? The slogans of the Third and Fourth Congresses. To the Masses. Make Use of the Questions of the Day. What resulted? Judged by our standards something quite worthless; a great deal, comparatively; freedom of movement for the formation of the Control Commissions, the Factory Councils, and the Proletarian Hundreds.

What was the result of exploiting the existing situation? Certainly, judged by the ultimate aims of Communism, nothing, something entirely worthless; but judged by the vital needs of the workers. something more: absolute confidence in the leadership of the German Communist Party.

This policy led to very dangerous illusions among the workers, who estimate too lightly the path laying before them. In our own Party circles illusions were created which perhaps might have been prevented by an intensive propaganda of principles. But the greatest danger was that they said to themselves: first a bourgeois coalition, then a Social-Democratic Government supported by the Communists, then a Government of Communists and Social-Democrats, and then a Government of the Communists—and all this without the necessity for severe and bloody fights. This frame of mind was a by-product of our policy, but that of course could not be avoided.

It would have been childish to say that since these dangers and difficulties must arise we must not pursue this policy. We had to attempt to overcome them. And how did we overcome