Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/16

 I would like to throw out just one more thought. The greatest cause of the crisis we are now experiencing, and of the many crises that we shall yet experience for years to come, if the revolution does not come, arises from the fact that we are the Party of dictatorship, but when there is no revolutionary wave, we can only conduct propaganda and agitation for the dictatorship. The masses however, do not live merely by propaganda and agitation alone. Practical tasks confront the Communist Party. It is so difficult to carry through the point of view of Communism, that a great discrepancy arises between desiring and doing. If we fail to see this, we shall break up. When I heard the speech of Thalman, I said to myself: What agitational zeal, what faith in the revolution: and yet in Hamburg we have 14,000 members, while the Social-Democrats have 78,000.

(A voice: It has now lost 30,000.)

After five years of the greatest betrayal of the revolution.

With a purely agitational policy of Communism, we will have only small Communist parties. The question will again arise, sect or masses. That question has already come up. Had we not restrained the Party in March, Levi would have been right. We restrained it, saying, go among the masses on a practical basis. And to-day the question has come up again,

We will fight out our differences. We are not Levis. Whatever the decision of the Executive will be, we will all submit, but we will not ignore the differences as they stand to-day. We will fight this matter out in the Communist International.

If the Commission will function, I will present my views in the form of the theses drawn up by Comrades Trotsky, P., and myself.

How is the October defeat to be explained? The representative of the Executive has described how he came to Germany to the Chemnitz Conference on the 22nd and was faced with a fait accompli. It must be made quite clear what it was that created the situation the Executive Representative had described.

I came to Germany on October 8th: on the 12th the Saxon Government was already formed. I arrived when the negotiations for the formation of the Government were almost completed. Events moved with great rapidity. I had no time to consider the situation which faced me carefully and thoroughly. The participation in the Saxon Government was a result of the decision of the Executive. The Executive demanded by telegram that the comrades should enter the government although the necessary preparations had not been made. I was against the proposal