Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/11

 Enlarged Executive, namely, the question of preparing for the mass struggle in Germany, and for the armed uprising.

(: Quite true!)

We did not do this. After the August events we saw the direction which things were tending, and we said: Either the Fascists take power, or we must. If we desired the fight, we could not make the defence of the November Republic our aim. The difference between the Kerensky and the November Republics was that under Kerensky the workers had the Soviets: they had something to defend. But the German November Republic did not live in the hearts of the workers; not a dog would move in its defence. Consequently, if we wished to fight through, we had to place as our aim the conquest of power.

What transpired? Before we here, in September and the beginning of October, had decided on this policy—the struggle for the capture of power, had decided the question of the date, as it were, Zinoviev wrote his draft of the fourteen points, which I amended, and which was sent to the German Party, not as decisions but for discussion. The German Party declared that it accepted the points. It was a programme of action. It stated concretely what should be done in all spheres. The outstanding fact is. that we could at no time conduct rearguard actions. When the Communist Press was suppressed we did not make a single retort.

We resolved, the situation is serious; either the Fascist take power, or we do. We decided that we must take power. We set ourselves a certain date. Now the attempt is being made to stamp this as the principal error. Now I say we must keep two things separate.

Firstly, when the Communists seriously think of capturing power must they set a definite time for their work, or not? They should.

Can you picture yourself saying to the masses: Dear comrades, we do not know when we shall take power, but for pedagogical reasons we fix a certain date? No, you cannot do this.

Therefore you must fix a date for the fight. The mistake was not in fixing a date, but in that the fixing of the date was done in Moscow. I pointed out at that time that only in the course of events can the body which is conducting the struggle fix the date. If Moscow fixes the date, the Party learns of it; if it does not, it is absurd to fix a date, for when it is necessary to postpone the fight it gives rise to panic and cries of treachery.

My opinion, however, is that fixing dates, whether right or wrong, is not in the least important. The main thing in the whole business is the fact that the Party had not reviewed the line of battle. They said, we must prepare for the attack, but they did nothing.

This was the outstanding fact of the defeat.

You may say, the important question is not whether we