Page:The League of Nations and the coming rule of law.djvu/13

 tribunal. Acceptance of the principle is what matters first.)

Thus Lord Parker's Council would be a body wielding no small authority. His plan for its constitution is novel and ingenious. 'Each member of the League should nominate one member of the Council. But for a special resolution'—that is, a resolution committing the League to measures of economic or military coercion—'there should be required, not only a majority of the members present and voting, but a majority of the councillors representing those members of the League mentioned in the schedule'—the executive Great Powers—'upon whom will fall the burden of any warlike proceedings.' This avoids by one bold stroke many troublesome questions of representation and contribution, and it may well be that no more exact provision would ever be needful. For, if the League be once fairly set up as a working body, it does not seem likely that dissension within or aggression from without will come to the point of calling for actual coercion.

Some new divergence of interests capable of breaking up the League is, no doubt, conceivable. Alliances are not eternal and constitutions are not infallible, but, if well made, they may do, as even with all former imperfections they have done, good service for a long time. Again, it is certain that, in the event of the German Empire remaining outside, the methods which recent disclosures have made familiar would be