Page:The League of Nations and freedom of the seas.djvu/16

 sea must be retained as essential to the executive ability of the League.

Obviously it must be so. For if those rights were abolished the Sea Powers as such could do nothing to enforce the will of the League. The executive force would lie almost entirely with the Military Powers, and the result of such unequal executive capacity cannot be contemplated with equanimity. It is too well known that the weight of a voice in the council chamber is not determined by reason alone, but in a much higher degree by the force behind it. The Naval Powers, bound hand and foot with the Freedom of the Seas, could speak, but they could not act, and inevitably the councils of the League would be dominated by the Military Powers. Is it credible that in the existing state of human progress a League of Nations under such conditions could make for the sanctity of covenants, the rights of small nations, and the peace of the world 1? Clearly it is not, and no less clear is it that if we are in earnest for a League of Peace we must concentrate on that end, and not dissipate energy in trying to achieve a wholly distinct aim at the same time. To strive for a League of Peace is to strive to prevent war; to strive for Freedom of the Seas is to admit war and strive to mitigate its terrors. Let us cease to confuse the two ends. Let us determine which line of endeavour we mean to follow, and pursue it with singleness of purpose and undivided effort. It will not be easy. It is to the