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Beech-Jones J the respondent serving a "more onerous period of imprisonment" was to the respondent's sentence being likely to be more onerous than either the general prison population serving sentences for federal offences or a hypothetical offender serving the same sentence, because the release of (at least some of) those prisoners on parole is not governed by s 19ALB of the Crimes Act. Either way, even when combined with the harsh day-to-day custodial conditions the respondent experiences, the above passage is not stating any more than that the respondent is likely to serve a greater proportion of his overall sentence in custody than those prisoners in custody for federal offences who are not subject to s 19ALB. This observation is most likely correct, but it is also irrelevant. It is irrelevant because, as the judgments of Gordon A-CJ, Steward and Gleeson JJ on the one hand and Jagot J on the other demonstrate, as with the approach to remissions, the fixing of the total sentence and the fixing of the non-parole period are not to be undertaken by reference to an assessment of whether or not an offender is likely to be released on parole at the conclusion of their non-parole period. Otherwise, there is no basis for concluding that the sentencing judge sentenced the respondent on the basis that he would be released at the conclusion of his non-parole period.

67 The error of the Court is exemplified by the approach their Honours adopted in fixing the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the respondent, as revealed by the following:

""Where there has otherwise been no error established on the part of the sentencing judge, there is no basis to interfere with the non-parole period of 3 years. However, the additional term of two years should be reduced to one year, being a sentence expiring on 23 August 2024. That variation recognises that the [respondent] will not get parole when ordinarily he would likely have obtained parole before the end of his sentence. If compassionate grounds amounting to exceptional circumstances arise within that period there is a chance he will obtain conditional release, but the chance is low and his liberty will then be subject to supervision." (emphasis added)"

68 This passage reveals a number of additional material errors of relevance to this appeal. First, it refers to an "additional term", which appears to be a phrase derived from the now repealed Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW). Under that