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Gordon A-CJ Steward J Gleeson J

22 First, a prisoner has no right to remission and there can never be a guarantee as to how much remission might be earned. The amount of remission would depend upon the prisoner's future behaviour. The same observation is equally true about the grant of parole under the Crimes Act.

23 Secondly, it is an elementary principle of law that the sentence of imprisonment should never exceed "that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the light of its objective circumstances". Increasing what would otherwise be a proportionate sentence by reference to the possibility of future remission would be a departure from this basic principle. The same is equally true here. Under s 16A of the Crimes Act, the obligation on the sentencing judge is to impose in every case a sentence "of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence".

24 Thirdly, increasing sentences by reference to the possibility of future remissions being earned would turn a legislative system of remissions "on its head". The very purpose of granting remissions is to benefit a prisoner for good behaviour; increasing the sentence from inception would undo that benefit. For the reasons expressed below, decreasing a sentence because of the low probability of parole would also turn the legislative purpose of s 19ALB "on its head", but for a different reason.

25 As the Director submitted, the principle which prevails in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, the United Kingdom and New Zealand is that a sentencing judge should also not take into account the likelihood of a release on parole in fixing a sentence of imprisonment.