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Gordon A-CJ Steward J Gleeson J

parole period is not appropriate having regard to certain matters, including the nature and circumstances of the offence or offences.

13 Importantly, as the plurality said in Johnson v The Queen, referring to the Crimes Act:

""[E]xcept to the extent stated in ss 16A and 16B of the [Crimes Act], general common law and not peculiarly local or state statutory principles of sentencing are applicable. That common law principles may apply follows from the use of the words 'of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence …' in s 16A(1) and the introductory words 'In addition to any other matters …' to s 16A(2) of the Act.""

14 As is self-evident, the probability of parole being granted following the expiration of a non-parole period, and any consequences arising from a grant of parole being probable or not, are not factors listed in s 16A(2) for consideration by a judge in determining a sentence of imprisonment. Nor are they matters that relevantly form part of the "circumstances of the offence" so as to engage s 16A(1).

15 This is unsurprising. The sentencing judge's task is separate to, and distinct from, the function of the executive in considering whether or not to grant parole under the Crimes Act.

Parole under the Crimes Act

16 The power to grant parole is vested in the executive branch of government, not the judiciary. Under the Crimes Act, the power exercisable by the Attorney-General is found in Div 5 of Pt IB of the Crimes Act. The purposes of parole, as defined by the Act, are three-fold: the protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the offender, and the reintegration of the offender into the community.