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338 tented himself with doing that, and with maintaining his watchful position, it is possible that the catastrophe which followed might have been avoided.

But Windham, brave as a lion, was anxious to do something. He accordingly transmitted to Sir Colin a plan he had devised of meeting the advance of the Gwáliár rebels by a system of 'aggressive defence,' by which he might destroy them in detail. Receiving no reply to that proposal, he resolved to carry it out. Early on the 24th, then, he marched six miles down the Kalpí road, and took a position so decidedly threatening to the rebels that, regarding it as a challenge, they took up the glove, and resolved to try to beat Windham at his own game.

Of the action which followed, fought on the 26th, 27th, and 28th, it must suffice to state that, whilst the early advantage lay with Windham, the astute leader opposed to him quickly perceived that the very success of his enemy might, with the numerical superiority he possessed, be used against him. Windham, though he had succeeded, had been compelled, by the nature of the ground, to fall back for the night to a position he considered he could hold until Sir Colin should arrive. It was a weak position, however, and Tantiá Topí saw that it offered many advantages to a superior force which should attack it. Having that superior force, he attacked him then the following morning, and after a contest, in which there were many changes of fortune, and the display of much soldierly ability on the part of Brigadier Carthew, drove Windham back into Kánhpur. Not content with that, he renewed the attack the following day, seized the station of Kánhpur, fired the bungalows, burned the clothing prepared for the relieved garrison of Lakhnao, and the stores for the British army, and forced