Page:The Idealistic Reaction Against Science (1914).djvu/121

 noted, and where there is no relation of sequence and intensity between the sensation experienced at the moment and those preceding it. In the most elementary act of perception we establish a relation between terms which can only be given in and by virtue of relations, and that which enters into this conscious relation is not sensation as such, but the fact that the sensation is felt. If, for instance, I recognise the action and presence of the fire in my vicinity, that which forms an integrant part of my knowledge is not the impression of heat, but merely the idea that I feel warm. This is proved by the fact that if I go farther away in order to make sure that the heat is produced by the fire, the impression of heat diminishes in intensity, whereas the perception of the scorching fire does not become more precise or undergo any change. Further, a too intense sensation does not act as an aid to knowledge, but rather as an impediment in its path, and, whilst the impression is perpetually subjected to a process of transformation, the fact conceived of its existence remains always the same. For instance, the sensation of red conveyed by a lady’s sunshade may vary in intensity, but there is no change in my knowledge of the fact that the sunshade is red in this determinate way. Knowledge in its ultimate analysis consists of relations, and experience, when all is said and done, is but a manifold of thought relations. If it be impossible to derive thought from sensation, as the empiricists do, the inverse procedure is equally unjustifiable, because, just as there is no such thing as pure sensation, there is no such thing as pure thought: these two phrases merely stand for abstractions to which there exists no corresponding reality either in the facts of the world or in the consciousness to which these facts stand in relation. Sensation and thought do not exist independently of each other, but are two inseparable aspects of the same living experience. By this we do not mean that all sentient animals must also be capable of thought: the relations from which the reality of their sensorial life is derived do not exist for their con-