Page:The History of Slavery and the Slave Trade.djvu/570

 the way of a permanent acquisition. And, though Mr. Clay's last letter on the subject, prior to the election of 1844, reiterated and emphasized all his objections to annexation under the existing circumstances, he did not include the existence of slavery.

In his first letter Mr. Clay said, "there were those who favored and those who opposed the annexation of Texas, from its supposed effect upon the balance of political power between two great sections of the union. He discountenanced the motive of acquiring territory for the purpose of strengthening one part of the union against another. If to-day Texas should be obtained to strengthen the south, to-morrow Canada might be acquired to add strength to the north. In the progress of this spirit of universal dominion, the part of the union now the weakest, would find itself still weaker from the impossibility of securing new theaters for those peculiar institutions which it is charged with being desirous to extend. But he doubted whether Texas would really add strength to the south. From the information he had of that country, he thought it susceptible of a division into five states of convenient size and form; three of which he thought would be unfavorable to the employment of slave labor, and would be free states, while only two of them would be slave states. This might serve to diminish the zeal both of those who oppose and those who urge annexation"

In conclusion, he thus sums up his opinions: He "considers the annexation of Texas, at this time, without the assent of Mexico, as a measure compromising the national character, involving us certainly in war with Mexico, probably with other foreign powers, dangerous to the integrity of the union, inexpedient to the present financial condition of the country, and not called for by any general expression of public opinion."

The sentiments expressed in the following extracts from Mr. Van Buren's letter are worthy of observation: "We must look to this matter as it really stands. We shall act under the eye of an intelligent, observing world; and the affair cannot be made to wear a different aspect from what it deserves if even we had the disposition (which we have not) to throw over it disguises of any kind. We should consider whether there is any way in which the peace of the country can be preserved, should an immediate annexation take place, save one — and that is, according to present appearances, the improbable event that Mexico will be deterred from the farther prosecution of the war by the apprehension of our power. The question then recurs, if, as sensible men, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the immediate annexation of Texas would, in all human probability, draw after it a war with Mexico, can it be expedient to attempt it? Of the consequences of such a war, the character it might be made to assume, the entanglements with other nations which the position of a belligerent almost unavoidably draws after it, and the undoubted injuries which might be inflicted upon each — notwithstanding the great disparity of their respective forces, I will not say a word. God forbid that an American citizen should ever count the cost of any appeal to what is appropriately denominated the last resort of nations, whenever that resort becomes necessary either for