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Rh great progress. Colonel Gamarra, who was in command of troops drawn from Upper Peru, was discovered to have secret correspondence with Belgrano, but the Viceroy dared not prosecute him from fear of arousing a mutiny among his men.

Pezuela was fully alive to the dangers of his position, and wrote earnestly to Spain for support. At the same time he instructed his successor in command of the Army of Upper Peru, to advance into Argentine territory. La Serna was driven back by Martin Güemes and his gauchos, but in this campaign saw such evidence of the superior quality of his troops that he thought it necessary to take precautions against possible disloyalty among them. He accordingly put an end to their independent organization, and drafted them into his Spanish regiments, a measure which was eventually productive of great evil to the Royalist cause.

The American officers were all staunch Royalists, but the Spanish officers were more or less infected with the new ideas. Thus, the morale of the Army of Upper Peru became greatly deteriorated. A part of it was soon after withdrawn to Lower Peru to reinforce the army there, in preparation for meeting the threatened invasion from Chile, upon which La Serna, alleging that he held his commission direct from the King, and had the right to dispose of his troops as he chose, threw up his command. Olañeta, a Peruvian and an ardent Royalist, was appointed to succeed him, and La Serna retired to Lima.

The Royalist army was at this time led by many distinguished officers, among them being Camba, the historian, and Valdés, who was held by Americans to be the most skilful and the most noble of all their adversaries. The army which held Lima was more than 8,000 strong, that of Upper Peru was more than 7,000. The total force, including detached garrisons, consisted of 23,000 men, against whom San Martin matched himself with 4,000 men in the last struggle for the independence of America.