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Rh surrender their sovereignty for union with a third, the United Kingdom of Great Britain—regarded as a hereditary enemy by at least one of them—is a tribute to Mr. Churchill’s high hopes and aspirations, not to his insight as a historian. It has no precedent in human history. Its failure to take place would be more in keeping with the record. Indeed, it would certainly have been much easier to achieve union between the indivisible United States and Great Britain after the First World War, in which they were close allies. Nothing like it ever happened, or was officially proposed, or was even suggested until the time of Mr. Churchill’s essay. On the basis of this essay, however, he must be credited with being the original, albeit indirect, sponsor of the programme of Union Now.

That an event has no precedent in human history is not, of course, an objection to its occurrence. Otherwise there would be no history. But the likelihood of such an event depends upon the nature of the situation that leads up to it. The Union that Mr. Churchill envisages in his reconstructed tale was unlikely because at the time there was nothing to lead up to it in terms of common history, activity, and interests. It comes as a suggestion out of the blue. Because at the present time the situation is different in these respects, his idea is an objective historical possibility even if it is not acted upon.

4. It is undoubtedly true that the First World War would not have broken out in August, 1914, if a union of English-speaking nations had delivered its ultimatum to Europe. There is evidence that Germany definitely counted on English–American neutrality during the time assigned by its High Command for finishing off France and Russia. Nonetheless it would have required more than an English–American démarche to banish the likelihood of a better-prepared-for war in the next few years, even if the crisis of 1914 had been peacefully settled. What was required was a permanent solution of the Balkan problem, agreement of all interested parties on the existence and control of the Berlin–Bagdad railroad, a redivision of the raw materials and colonial markets of the world, Germany’s return to Bismarck’s naval policy, and considerable military disarmament all around—not to speak of profound modifications in the internal capitalist economy of the major powers. There is not the slightest evidence that these requirements stood an appreciable chance of being fulfilled.