Page:The Hero in History.djvu/30

30 concerning human life, struggle, and death have a universal appeal to reflective minds in all developed civilizations.

Even when a philosophy lends itself to acceptance, no one has been able to show that its particular system of ideas is uniquely necessitated by the needs of the society, or the dominant class within the society, which adopts it. Some other cognate philosophical systems are theoretically just as serviceable. But among all the possible systems that may be exploited for purposes of social idealization or criticism, those that win the competition for acceptance are usually distinguished by comprehensiveness, rigour, practical relevance, and flexibility—virtues that are unequally distributed among philosophers.

What does the history of science show? The cumulative character of scientific discovery, the unity of its method or inquiry the common problems that are set for it by previous investigators, and the intimate relations between science, industry, and war seem to make extremely unplausible the hypothesis that scientific development owes most of its achievements to the activities of its leading figures. In addition, it is now a commonplace that many epoch-making discoveries in science have been the work of two men working independently of each other, for example, Newton and Leibnitz on the differential calculus, Darwin and Wallace on evolution, Adams and Leverrier on the perturbations of the orbit of Uranus which led to the discovery of Neptune. Grant, too, that a revolutionary discovery may depend upon the contribution of a humble laboratory assistant operating a calculating machine.

Nonetheless, what all these considerations boil down to is the recognition of the fact that greatness in science consists in successfully meeting theoretical and practical problems rather than in creating them, and that science like every other human discipline receives some of its stimuli of development from the needs and pressures of social life. But this does not gainsay a fact, just as obvious, that in order to do the work of a Newton or a Darwin an individual must equal them in intellectual stature. In the absence of a dozen laboratory assistants, it is not mystical to assume that someone else would have been found to turn the crank of the calculating machine or to plot a star map. In the absence of both Newton and Leibnitz or of any comparable intelligence with the power to master their problem successfully (where the power is independently determined), it is mystical to assume that some other individual would