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Rh was able to stave off France’s fate in 1940. At best, then, Chamberlain may be considered an eventful man, certainly not event-making.

How fantastically false was Chamberlain’s consciousness of his own historical role may be plainly seen in his memorable address to the House of Commons on October 6, 1938. He unequivocally declared that whether there should be war or not depended upon him, and on him alone, and that his decision had banished its shadows for our time: "Anyone who had been through what I have had to go through, day after day and face to face, with the thought that in the last resort it would be I, I alone, who would have to say that “yes” or “no” which would decide the fate of millions of my countrymen and their wives and families;—anyone who has been through that, would not readily forget…. A man who gets to my age in my position tends to feel that he may disregard any abuse that is levelled at him if his conscience approves what he has done. Looking back on those events I feel convinced… that my action was only what one in my position would do. I say that by my action I did avert war."

It is a sobering thought that a statesman in a democracy can believe and openly proclaim that on his single word the destiny of his nation depends. But far more significant here is Chamberlain’s political innocence in seriously entertaining the notion that he could stop a war that had been in the making from the very moment Hitler assumed power.

Once Fascism had consolidated its internal position, it was beyond the effort of a host of peace-loving statesmen to block the dynamic force to war that was generated by a peculiar combination of economic need, fanatical ideology, and intense chauvinism. Hitler made no secret of his intentions before he came to power, and every step he took after he came to power showed that German society was being geared to total war. The sole effect of negotiation with him could be at most a calendar victory—an enforced change in his timetable. This might have tremendous importance, but only in relation to the striking power of the armies when war broke out. A statesman who imagined that, by a pact or memorandum, or by any concession short of total capitulation, he could immobilize