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 The Recall in Colorado to the laws which constitute the subject of this paper is now not a matter of consequence. It is upon us, and the thing to do is to understand it in all of its phases, and prepare to find the best of it and escape the worst of it. In our determination not to oppose the law, however, we are not deprived of the opportunity of analyzing, criti cising, and suggesting in relation thereto; in fact, we believe that is the object and purpose of the occasion. We in Colorado, as in so many things, are on the subject of the recall more fortunate than many of our sister states. Many of them in the poverty of their legislation upon the subject have but one phase of recall, namely the recall of officers from office. We go them one better, and are provided with the very latest invention upon the subject, namely the recall, or more properly speaking the review of judicial deci sions, when rendered upon certain subjects by the only court in which is left the power to speak upon those particu lar subjects at all. If there is any other state in the Union that has upon its statute books this very novel law, it has not been called to my attention; and whether our constitutional provision upon that subject is a law, which the people of this state will be required to observe, will probably not be known until the court of last resort has ex pressed its opinion upon the many vaga ries, ambiguities, uncertainties, and con fusions therein embodied, as will be elucidated by a careful analysis of the constitutional provisions. Of this particular subject we will speak later; let us now devote our attention to a cursory analysis of the amendment adopted and appearing in our constitu tion as Article 21, and familiarly known as The Recall from Office. This amendment was carried by a

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popular majority of a little over fourteen thousand, less than thirty-five per cent of the entire vote polled having voted on the subject. So it remains a mooted question whether it is the will of the majority of the people of the state, but it is settled that it is the will of the majority of those who saw fit to express their opinion thereon, and this makes it law. There has been some discussion of the validity even of a constitutional enact ment of this character, upon the theory that the direct management and control of the elective officers by the people at large was such a relegation to a purely democratic form of government as to be inimical to that provision of the federal Constitution guaranteeing to each of the states a republican form of gov ernment, and that portion of the enabling act whereby we pledge ourselves to maintain, at all times, a republican form of government for our common wealth. The few state courts that have passed upon this question have held similar constitutional provisions or statu tory laws to be within the legislative power, and not inhibited by the federal organic law.2 Our federal Supreme Court, while not passing upon this particular question, yet one of similar import — the ini tiative—has held the question to be not justiciable, but one for the determina tion of the supreme law-making body of the land.3 The matter presents itself to my mind as meaning merely an additional method of removing an incumbent from his office, which if done for cause un doubtedly would appear just as legiti mate as would the method by informa(Texas) • Bonner . v. Belsterling. et al. 137 S. W. 1154 • Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Pltf. in Error v. State of Oregon. 32 Sup. Ct. 224. See also Ex Parte Wanger. 95 Pac. (Okla.) 435.