Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 25.pdf/154

 Latest Important Cases of argument and that it means that the force and violence in 'making entry' must create visible traces upon the premises themselves which sur vive the act that produces them, and which being seen are evidence of a burglary; that it would be a distortion of the meaning of language to hold as argued that this provision is satisfied under the circumstances of this case. . . ." Cullen, Ch. J., and Haight, J., dissented. Reported in A'. Y. Law Journal, Feb. 1. Marriage and Divorce. Extra-territorial Effect of Illinois Statute — Domiciled Citizen Temporarily Leaving State to Obtain Divorce. Ill. Section la of chapter 40, Hurd's Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1911, provides: "That in every case in which a divorce has been granted. . . neither party shall marry again within one year from the time the decree was granted;. . . and said marriage shall be held absolutely void." The Supreme Court of Illi nois, in Wilson v. Cook, decided Dec. 17, held that under this statute a marriage celebrated in St. Louis, outside the state of Illinois, within a year after a decree of divorce, was invalid. The Court (Dunn, C. J.) said: "It is un doubtedly the general rule of law that a marriage valid where it is celebrated is valid everywhere, but there are two well recognized exceptions, viz., marriages which are contrary to the law of nature, as generally recognized by Christian nations, and those which are declared by posi tive law to have no validity. Every state has the power to enact laws which will personally bind its citizens while sojourning in a foreign jurisdiction provided such laws profess to so bind them, and to declare that marriages con tracted between its citizens in foreign states in disregard of the statutes of the state of their domicile will not be recognized in the courts of the latter state though valid where celebrated. (Roth v. Roth, 104 I1l. 35.) The question, there fore, is whether the statute quoted was clearly intended to apply to marriages contracted out side the state, for unless the intention is clear, the operation of the statute must be limited to marriages within the state." This question was decided in accordance with the construction of a similar statute adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The latter court said : — "There is no limitation as to the place of the pretended marriage in express terms, nor is lan guage used from which such a limitation can naturally be implied. It seems unquestionably

141

intended to control the conduct of the residents of the state, whether they be within or outside of its boundaries. Such being, in our opinion, the evident and clearly expressed intent of the legis lature, we hold that when persons domiciled in this state and who are subject to the provisions of the law, leave the state for the purpose of evading those provisions, and go through the cere mony of marriage in another state and return to their domicile, such pretended marriage is within the provisions of the law and will not be recognized by the courts of this state." Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360. Monopolies. Application of Sherman Act to Cotton Corner — Involuntary Restraints of Trade Unlawful — Direct and Material Burden ing of Trade. U. S. Though the Circuit Court had held a cotton corner such as that in the case at bar not within the terms of the Sherman anti-trust act, the United States Supreme Court held otherwise in U. S. v. Patten (L. ed. adv. sheets, no. 6, p. 141), decided Jan. 6. Mr. Justice Van Devanter de livered the opinion of the Court, saying in part: "We come, then, to the question whether a conspiracy to run a corner in the available supply of a staple commodity, such as cotton, normally a subject of trade and commerce among the states, and thereby to enhance arti ficially its price throughout the country, and to compel all who have occasion to obtain it to pay the enhanced price or else to leave their needs unsatisfied, is within the terms of § 1 of the anti trust act, which makes it a criminal offense to 'engage in' a 'conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.' The cir cuit court, as we have seen, answered the question in the negative; and this, although accepting as an allegation of fact rather than as a mere economic theory of the pleader the statement in the counts that interstate trade and com merce would necessarily be obstructed by the operation of the conspiracy. The reasons as signed for the ruling, and now pressed upon our attention, are (1) that the conspiracy does not belong to the class in which the members are engaged in interstate trade or commerce, and agree to suppress competition among themselves, (2) that running a corner, instead of restraining competition, tends, temporarily at least, to stimulate it, and (3) that the obstruction of interstate trade and commerce resulting from the operation of the conspiracy, even although a necessary result, would be so indirect as not to be a restraint in the sense of the statute.