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The Green Bag

owever, has been completely remedied y the increase in the number of judges, together with certain well known changes and improvements in the practice of the courts. After the case has once been tried and decided by law there is very little delay in the appellate court. Our Court of Appeals holds three terms dur ing the year, and almost invariably disposes of every case on the docket be fore adjourning for the term. So far as that court is concerned we have "jus tice speedily and without delayi" It is in the bringing of the cause to trial in the court of first instance that he meets with delay in its most intolerable form. Suppose we take for illustra tion a typical case, familiar to us all. A merchant brings a suit in one of the courts of Baltimore upon a promissory note. The defendant pleads the statute of limitations. The merchant relies upon a new promise. The case is called for trial within a very reasonable time after its institution. The merchant is on hand with his counsel and his wit nesses. The witnesses are business men who are attending the trial at some incon venience, but who would have no ob jection whatever to devoting a reasonable amount of their time to aid their friend, the plaintiff, in his effort to collect his debt. But instead of the case being tried, this is what happens : the defendant happens to have as his counsel a lawyer who has a large trial practice. He may be one who is a favorite with the plain tiffs in damage cases, or he may be one who is counsel for corporations, such as liability insurance companies, so-called, who has many cases on the dockets of the courts in which he appears for the defendants. In either case, the result is the same. When the Court, after calling the case, makes the usual inquiry as to whether the parties are ready for trial the plaintiff promptly answers in

the affirmative, but a young man arises on the other side and states that he is from Mr. C's office, and that Mr. C.F the counsel for the defendant, is engaged or about to become engaged in the trial of another case in the court at the other end of the hall, and desires that the trial of this case be postponed until the case which he is now trying or about to try shall have been concluded. In the English court such an applica tion would not be considered for a mo ment. The defendant would be told that the rules of practice did not permit the postponement of trials to suit the con venience of counsel; that the defendant must have other counsel ready to take Mr. C's place, or let the trial proceed under the management of the junior. The judge, being invariably a lawyer of the highest order and ample experience himself, would endeavor to see to it in such cases that the defendant suffered no injustice, even if he had to leave the case to the junior, something which the defendant, however, does not ordinarily do. But what happens in the Maryland court? The application for postpone ment is granted as a matter of course. The defendant is entitled to it under the rules of our practice there prevailing. The witnesses who have been in attend ance not infrequently for several hours before the case is called are "discharged until further notice." Mr. C. proceeds with the trial of the cause which has been the occasion of the postponement. At the close of that trial counsel for our merchant friend endeavors to bring his case on to trial, but finds it impossible to do so by reason of the fact that anoth er case in the same court is on trial. He waits until the conclusion of that case and then announces his readiness to pro ceed. Thereupon the young man from Mr. C.'s office arises again, and states