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 Latest Important Cases judges in Oklahoma it will be the fault of the judges themselves." Cruel Punishments. Sterilization of Crimi nals not so Regarded — Construction of State Constitution. Wash. In State v. Feilen, 126 Pac. Rep. 75, decided in September, the Supreme Court of Washington had under consideration a statute of Washing ton (sec. 2287, Rem. & Bal.) providing: "Whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty of carnal abuse of a female person under the age of ten years, or of rape, or shall be adjudged to be an habitual criminal, the court may, in addition to such other punishment or confine ment as may be imposed, direct an operation to be performed upon such person for the preven tion of procreation." According to a statement appearing in the New York Law Journal (Oct. 8, 1912) "the defendant had been convicted of statutory rape committed upon the person of a female under the age of ten years. He was sentenced to im prisonment for life, and further, under the statute above quoted, to submit to vasectomy, the particular form of operation fixed by the trial judge under the broad legislative language. The only point seriously considered on the appeal was whether the undergoing of such operation, carefully and skillfully performed, amounted to a cruel punishment forbidden by the constitu tion. The Washington constitution differs from the federal Constitution and from those of most of the states in forbidding merely cruel punish ment and not cruel and unusual punishment." The Court held the operation of vasectomy not to be a cruel punishment within the meaning of the state constitution. The New York Law Journal comments as follows: "In the Weems case [Weems v. 217 U.S. 350] the judicial power was exerted to declare cruel and unusual a penalty imposed under a Philippine statute not because it was of unique character, but because it was excessively severe. It is not at all improbable that the state courts will interpret the corresponding clause of state constitutions as not fixed but progressive, and, conversely to the Weems case, so as to sanction forms of punishment not wantonly or extremely cruel and shown to be appropriate to an offense by new conditions developed under social pro gress." Employer's Liability. Defense of Assumed Risk — Violation by Employer of Safety Appliance Statute — Public Policy. N. Y. Public policy precludes an employee from

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assuming a risk created by his employer's viola tion of a statute or from waiving liability of the latter for injuries caused thereby, according to a ruling of the New York Court of Appeals (Cullen, C. J.) in Fitzwater v. Warren, decided Oct. 22. The plaintiff, without previous experience in the work, was injured within four days after his employment by coming in contact with an unguarded setscrew in a revolving shaft near the floor. He knew of its existence, but the shaft revolved in a bed of sawdust which yielded to the pressure of his foot, bringing it in contact with the screw. It was held that the plaintiff's know ledge of the danger, which the employer in viola tion of the statute had permitted to exist, did not defeat a recovery for the injury and that, under the circumstances, the assumption of risk was a fair question for the jury. Collin, J., dissented. ( N. Y. Law Jour., Nov. 4.) Master and Servant. See Employer's Liability. Negligence. See Employer's Liability. Political Candidates. Keeping the Judi ciary out of Politics — Construction of State Constitution. Wash. A provision of the Washington constitution reads as follows:— "The judges of the Supreme Court and the judges of the Superior Court shall be ineligible to any other office or public employment than a judicial office or employment during the term for which they shall have been elected." Judge W. W. Black of the Superior Court, Democratic nominee for Governor of Washing ton, contended that as his term of judicial office would expire two days before the beginning of the Governor's term of office, his candidacy was not a violation of the constitution. The Supreme Court interpreted the provision to mean that it was the paramount desire of the framers of the constitution "to keep the judges out of politics. Both the letter and the spirit of the constitution are in harmony with this view." The Court further said that the framers "knew the importance of confining judges to the per formance of their judicial duties, and the evils that would attend if judges were permitted to take part during their term in the activities of a political campaign for the furtherance of their political ambitions." Judge Crow dissented, but said that as a matter of ethics he heartily concurred in the "wholesome idea expressed in the majority opinion." Sterilization. See Cruel Punishments.