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The Green Bag

they used the wrong weapon. You cannot make much of a hole with a jack-plane, and with waiver you can do very little against the insur ance companies. I recommend a trial of election. ' ' "Waiver of Breach of Conditions in Insura nee Policy by Demanding Proofsand Adjusting Loss." By Clyde McLemore. 75 Central Law Journal 293 (Oct. 18). Judicial Organization. "Judicial Legislation in Egypt." By Norman Bentwich. 28 Law Quarterly Review 372 (Oct.). Dealing with the constitutional development of Egypt, particularly as regards legislation relating to the judiciary. "Judicial legislation," in the sense of the phrase which has become current in this country, is not the theme of the article. "The New Federal Judicial Code." By Jacob Trieber. 46 American Law Review 702 (Sept.Oct.). Judicial Power to Annul Statutes. See Legal History. Labor Laws. "Industrial War." By Hugh H. Lusk. Forum, v. 48, p. 553 (Nov.) The remedy for industrial civil war is said to be practical recognition of the right of skilled labor to share with capital the profits of manu facturing enterprise. Arbitration is regarded defective as merely a temporizing remedy. What this author proposes is statute regulation of wages and dividend rates. See Social Reform. Trade Disputes. Legal History. "The Historic Relation of Judicial Power to Unconstitutional Legislation." By Hon. Hampton L. Carson. 60 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 687 (Oct.). "Thus from 1790 to 1894 inclusive, the Supreme Court has exercised the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, because of con flict with the Constitution, in twenty-one sepa rate instances. I find none since. During the same period it exercised the same power without challenge of remark, as to jurisdiction, in relation to the statutes of the states and territories in one hundred and eighty-two instances. "After these numerous and repeated exercises of power, all of which, even the earliest, rest upon the soundest and broadest foundations, it is pre posterous to speak of a decision of the Supreme Court as an 'assumption of authority.'" "An Historical Note on the Dartmouth College Case." By Charles Warren. 46 American Law Review 665 (Sept.-Oct.). "In view of the immense effect of the decision upon the future jurisprudence and corporate growth in this country, it is interesting to note that its importance was little realized in the public press of the times." "The Genius of the Common Law, V." By Sir Frederick Pollock. 12 Columbia Law Re view 577 (Nov.). See 24 Green Bag 225. "The Evolution of the Modern Will." By

Charles H. Lee. 46 American Law Review 641 (Sept.-Oct.). See Mohammedan Law. Literature. "Turkish and English Law Compared." By Roger North. "Law from Lay Classics, I." 7 Illinois Law Review 167 (Oct.). An extract from a work published in 1744. "It is granted, that Justice is a rare Thing, if it may be had; but if it is to be gained by sail ing through a Sea of Delays, Repetitions, and Charges, really it may be as good a Bargain to stay at home a Loser. A wrong Determination, expedite, is better than a right one, after ten V'ears Vexation, Charge, and Delay. A good Cause, immediately lost is, in some Respects, gained; for the Party hath his Time, and Tran quillity of Mind reserved to himself, to use as he pleaseth; which is a rare Thing, in the Opinion of those who have felt the Want of both, and of their Money to boot." Marriage and Divorce. "Annulment of Marriage for Fraud." 2 Bench and Bar N. S. 104 (Oct.). Treating the subject from the point of view of New V'ork law. Minimum Wage. See Social Reform. Mohammedan Law. "A Historical Study of Mohammedan Law, II." By Syed H. R. Abdul Majid. 28 Law Quarterly Review 355 (Oct.). This instalment deals with the Islamite law of government, more specifically with the social contract doctrine of the Caliphate, Monopolies. "The Need and Proper Scope of Federal Legislation against Restrictions upon Competition." By Frederick H. Cooke. 46 American Law Review 676 (Sept.-Oct.). "It may well be a legitimate application of the 'rule of reason' to inquire whether public injury has resulted in the shape of increased price of groceries, or deterioration of the quality thereof. But why should the public concern themselves, in this connection, with the quarrels or other differences between the grocers, or, for that mat ter, with quarrels or other differences between the grocers or outsiders? Why should they concern themselves to determine whether the means employed to eliminate competition were fair or unfair? Why allow inquiry into the existence of a public injury to degenerate into inquiry into the existence of tortious interference of a mere private injury? To apply such ir relevant test seems to us to result from, and to result in, confusion. . . . "Federal legislation against restrictions upon competition should be strictly confined to its proper scope, instead of being also allowed appli cation to what is essentially distinct from restric tions upon competition, as has conspicuously resulted from the use of the expressions, 'restraint of trade,' etc., the technical doctrine against