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 The Progress of Uniform Legislation as that afforded by the Conference, are suffi ciently plain. . . .7

Another says : — It is true that, although commissioned by the governor or the legislature of their respective states, the Commissioners do not work under pressure of any kind, and, by disposition and training are not men who are impatient for quick results. . . . In drawing up a code of laws that is expected to abide the test of time and intense controversy, the important thing is not haste, but accuracy, careful phrasing and the exact use of words to avoid confusion and reduce the necessity for construction on the part of the courts to a minimum. The most noticeable characteristic of much modern legislation is the haste with which it is enacted, as if the most important thing about a proposed bill was to get it on the statute books as quickly as possible. ... If all proposed laws of a general nature were first sub mitted to the careful consideration of a body of experts like the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, they would seldom fail of their pur pose and would give rise to very few serious problems for courts to unravel. . . . The desire for uniformity ... is still a beacon light of hope to those interested in the work of the Commission. . . . The variance in the deci sions. . . which construe such acts as the Negotiable Instruments Law, is comparatively slight and not sufficient to occasion any discour agement. Moreover, the courts are showing an increasing tendency to be governed by the weight of authority in other states in construing Uniform Laws and the Commission has the opportunity at intervals of correcting discrepancies or vari ances by suggesting uniform amendments which serve the double purpose of perfecting the law itself and adapting it to some changed situation as well as of maintaining the desired uniformity.8

It will be seen that appreciation of the purposes and accomplishments of this Conference is widening and, however slowly, results are being achieved that are well worthy of the efforts they cost. The Negotiable Instruments Law The report of the Committee on Commercial Law will deal with proposed 7 23 Green Bag, p. 654.


 * 74 Central Law Journal, pp. 1, 2.

459

amendments to this the first and prob ably the most important of what have been properly called the American Uni form Commercial Acts. Without wait ing for the action of the Committee, an act was passed in Massachusetts rela tive to the liability of a bank for the payment of forged negotiable instru ments. This act provides that unless within one year after the return of a negotiable instrument to a depositor he shall notify the bank in writing that it is forged, or was made or endorsed with out authority, or that it has been mate rially altered, the bank shall not be liable to the depositor on account of the payment of such instrument.* A number of decisions have been ren dered by the various state courts mak ing reference to sections of the Nego tiable Instruments Law, as will appear by the citations given in the notes.10 • Acts Mass. 1912, ch. 277. 10 Nebraska (from Commissioner R. W. Breckenridge) : Harrington Nat'l Bank v. Breslin. 88 Neb. 47, interpreting sec. 14 (blanks when they may be filled); Aurora State Bank v. Hayes-Ames Elevator Co., 88 Neb. 187, interpreting sec. 30 (what consti tutes negotiation?); Gruenther v. Bank of Monroe, 90 Neb. 280, interpreting sec. 188 (effect where the holder of check procures it to be certified). Missouri (from Commissioner Seneca N. Taylor) : Stephenson v. Joplin State Bank, 160 Mo. App. 47 (where a note shows on its face that a party exe cuted it as principal, he cannot contradict his written obligation by parol); Lehnhard v. Sidway, 160 Mo. App. 83 (question of acceptance by separate writ ing). Washington (from Commissioners W. B. Tanner and Charles E. Shepard) : Barker v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 260 (the sum payable is a sum certain within the meaning of the act, although it is to be paid by stated installments); First Nat'l Bank v. Sullivan, 66 Wash. 375 (defining an unqualified promise to pay though coupled with an indication of a particu lar fund); Am. Saving Bank & T. Co. v. Hilgesen, 64 Wash. 54 (usury is not available as a defense to the maker of a note to an innocent holder for value before maturity); Citizens Savings Bank v. Houlchins, 64 Wash. 275 (whether party plaintiff was a bonafide holder for value before maturity, the title of the original payees having been defective); Ekre v. Cain, 66 Wash. 659 (an oral guarantee of a note turned over in payment of the guarantor's indebtedness is sufficient guarantee for subsequent written guarantee of its payment); State v. Garland, 65 Wash. 666 (a certificate of deposit endorsed and delivered to defendant answers all the requirements