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The Green Bag

While the mere combining of several inde pendent railway terminal systems into one does not necessarily operate as a forbidden restraint of interstate commerce under the Sherman anti-trust law of 1890, the combi nation and unification of the terminal facilities at St. Louis under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all the railway companies under compulsion to use them — the inherent conditions being such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of railway access to that city — violates the provisions of the anti-trust act, in that it constitutes a contract or com bination in restraint of commerce among the states, and an attempt to monopolize such commerce which must pass through the gateway at St. Louis. This was the finding of the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, decided April 22 (Oct. term, 1911, no. 386). Mr. Justice Lurton, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said: — "It cannot be controverted that, in ordinary circumstances, a number of independent com panies might combine for the purpose of con trolling or acquiring terminals for their common but exclusive use. In such cases other companies might be admitted upon terms or excluded altogether. If such terms were too onerous, there would ordinarily remain the right and power to construct their own terminals. But the situation at St. Louis is most extraordinary, and we base our conclusion in this case, in a large measure, upon that fact. The 'physical or topographical condition peculiar to the locality,' which is advanced as a prime justifi cation for a unified syetem of terminals, con stitutes a most obvious reason why such a unified system is an obstacle, a hindrance, and a restriction upon interstate commerce, unless it is the impartial agent of all who, owing to conditions, are under such compulsion, as here exists, to use its facilities." Motor Vehicles. Statute Requiring Owner oj Car in Accident to Stop and Give His Name to the Police — Sustained as Valid Exercise of Police Power — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. Mo. A statute which has been declared uncon stitutional in New York has been upheld in Missouri. A law passed by the Missouri legis lature in 1911 (Session Acts, 1911, p. 322) provides for compulsory registration and re quires the owner of an automobile to stop and

report to the police when an accident occurs, and to give his name and address, and the number of the vehicle, and to render assistance to the person or persons injured. This statute was borrowed from one first adopted in New York in 1910. After its adoption in Missouri, the intermediate appellate courts in New York held it unconstitutional. People v. Rosenheimer, 128 N. Y. Sup. 1093, 130 N. Y. Sup. 544. In Ex parte Kneedler, decided by the second division of the Missouri Supreme Court June 1, the applicant for a writ of habeas corpus had been in his automobile when it ran over and killed a man in East St. Louis on the night of Oct. 14, 1911. In an indictment he was charged with violating the statute already referred to, in that he had commanded and induced his chauffeur to flee. Circuit Judge James E. Withrow of St. Louis held that the defendant was charged with the commission of a felony, as an accomplice after the fact. The defendant then filed a motion before Judge Withrow to quash the information, on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional and void because it required the defendant to testify against himself. This motion being overruled, Kneedler applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition based on the same contention. The writ was denied, and Kneedler then brought habeas corpus proceedings in the Supreme Court. Judge Ferris, in denying the application, and in affirming Judge Withrow's ruling, upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police power, and said : — "The statute is a simple police regulation. It does not make the accident a crime. If a crime is involved it arises from other statutes. It does not attempt in terms to authorize the admission of the information as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The mere fact that the driver discloses his identity is no evidence of guilt, but rather of innocence. State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 67. ... "Every person who operates or uses a motor vehicle must be regarded as exercising a privi lege and not an unrestricted right. It being a privilege granted by the Legislature, a person enjoying such privilege must take it subject to all proper restrictions." Self-Incriminating Testimony. See Motor Vehicles. Workmen's Compensation. See Em ployers' Liability.