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 Index to Periodicals to deal with the charity property as it pleases, and, in point of fact, to do anything which within certain limits it thinks expedient to be done with the property (Philpott v. St. George's Hospital, 27 Beav. 107, 122 R. R. 337). This is quite a mistaken view of the jurisdiction of the court." Direct Government. "The Initiative and Referendum." By Henry M. Campbell. 10 Michigan Law Review 427 (Apr.). "If the great mass of intelligent people, who are now so indifferent to public affairs and so engrossed in their own, would give but a small part of their time and attention to public ques tions and the selection of proper representatives, then there would be no difficulty under our present system in adequately protecting the interests and securing the welfare of all of the people and in giving effect to their will." f Due Process of Law. "Federal Intervention under the Fourteenth Amendment." By Charles Wallace Collins. 21 Yale Law Journal 470 (Apr.). "We cannot answer the question as to how far federal intervention can go under the_ Fourteenth Amendment. We can see how far it has gone, but a study of all of these cases fails to enable one to set limitations for the amendment in the future, under the present federal procedure. For practical purposes this principle of inter vention may be stated in the following words: No state can make or enforce any law which shall, upon proper proceedings, be deemed unreasonable by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States. This involves the interpretation in each case of the terms 'due process of law' and 'equal protection of the laws." The rule of reason alone governs. What are fair profits, what are excessive taxes, what are proper health laws, what is confiscation and what discrimination — these are questions which cannot be answered in the abstract nor can they be adequately defined by precedents. If it becomes incumbent on the Supreme Court of the United States to pass judgment on them, it must consider the reasonableness of each con crete case." Federal and State Powers. Process of Law, Railway Rates.

See Due

General Jurisprudence. "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. Ill, Conclusion." By Professor Roscoe Pound. 25 Harvard Law Review 489 (Apr.). Continued from 24 Han. L. Rev. 591 (23 G. B. 425), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 140 (24 G. B. 88). Having in the two earlier papers considered the three schools of juristic philosophy, Analytic, Historical, and Philosophical, which were the forerunners of the present Sociological school, and having shown how in their later develop ments these three schools approached common ground, Professor Pound now, in the concluding portion of his invaluable essay upon a timely and fruitful subject, traces the progress of this

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resulting sociological school, which is still in a formative stage. The Comtist Positivism, to which some atten tion has already been given, was really the starting point of this sociological jurisprudence. While there are those who still "appear to insist that sociological jurisprudence must be identi fied with a philosophical jurisprudence of the positivist type," we have really got far beyond this position. Sociological jurisprudence has gone through the same process of development as sociology, in that the old mechanical-biologi cal conceptions have gradually been displaced. Accordingly, Professor Pound divides the bio logical stage into four successive types of theory: (1) the mechanical, (2) the ethnological, (3) the philosophical, and (4) the organismic. Space does not permit reproduction of the acute observations on these various phases of juridical theory, but the discussion will be found quite as valuable from the standpoint of the student of sociology as from that of the student of jurisprudence. Next the importance of Ward's service to sociology is recognized, and with it comes the beginning of a new epoch, the method of which is not biological so much _as psychological. Gierke and Tarde are recognized as important factors in giving the sociological jurisprudence a new turn. At the present time, jurisprudence is in the stage of unification : "Presently it was seen also that not only was it needful to combine the several methods that had been employed in sociology and to unify the science, but that it was equally needful to put the science into relation with the other social sciences; to unify the social sciences by recog nizing that they are 'merejy methodological divisions of societary science in general.' . . . "The main problem to which sociological jur ists are addressing themselves today is to enable and to compel law-making, and also interpre tation and application of legal rules, to take more account, and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied. . . . "Summarily stated, the sociological jurist pursues a comparative study of legal systems, legal doctrines, and legal institutions as social phenomena, and criticizes them with respect to their relation to social conditions and social progress. Comparing sociological jurists with jurists of the other schools, we may say: — "1. They look more to the working of the law than to its abstract content. "2. They regard law as a social institution which may be improved by intelligent human effort, and hold it their duty to discover the best means of furthering and directing such effort. "3. They lay stress upon the social purposes which law subserves rather than upon sanction. "4. They urge that legal precepts are to be regarded more as guides to results which are socially just and less as inflexible molds. "6. Their philosophical views are very diverse. Beginning as positivists, recently they have adhered to some one of the groups of the social