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 Workmen's Compensation that there are conflicting views among the members of the court in regard to the matter, and that "since the dis position of the questions which it sug gests is not necessary to the decision of the case, we do not decide it." (Ives v. S. Buf. Ry. Co., 94 N. E. 431, 439.) In re Opinion of Justices (July 24, 1911), 96 N. E. 308, a Massachusetts work men's compensation bill came before the Supreme Judicial Court of that state on application of the state senate for an opinion of its validity, but the ques tion of jury trial was not brought up, and as the justices confined themselves strictly to the matter asked for, namely, whether such a law would be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and a similar pro vision in the state Constitution, there is nothing to be obtained from that opin ion. The question is not raised in the case of Borgnis v. Falk Co. (Wis., Nov. 1911), 133 N. W. 209, but in that case the contention was advanced that the statute in question was unconstitutional because it vests judicial power in the Industrial Commission not composed of men elected by the people, in viola tion of those clauses of the state Con stitution, which give the judicial power to certain courts and provide for elec tion of judges by the people. The court held that the Industrial Commission was not a court but an administrative body, which in the course of its admin istration of this law is empowered to ascertain some questions of fact and apply the existing law thereto. In so doing, although the Commission acts quasi-judicially, nevertheless, it is not thereby vested with judicial power in the constitutional sense. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N. V. 209, 219. Public utility commissions, railway rate com missions, boards of equalization, and the like, are similar administrative bodies

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which exercise quasi-judicial functions without being repugnant to such a con stitutional provision. The constitutional guarantee of trial by jury was passed over by the Supreme Court of Montana, in upholding the validity of the miners' compensation act of that state, as applying only "to trial of cases, actions, or suits at law." The Montana statute is similar in its operation to the Wisconsin law just referred to, in that the state is directly involved in its administration. It pro vides for the creation of an indemnity fund, collected from the mine operators, out of which the injured miners are compensated. The Court says: "The adjustment of claims under the act is an administrative function and not a judicial proceeding, and it is only in certain cases falling under the latter designation that trial by jury is guar anteed by the Constitution." (Cun ningham v. N. W. Improvement Co., 119 Pac. 554, 564.) The Supreme Court of Washington, in its recent decision sustaining the compulsory workmen's insurance act of that state (State ex. rel. v. Clausen, 117 Pac. 1101, 1119), after a careful discussion of the matter of trial by jury, disposes of it with the following words: "The act here in ques tion-takes away the cause of action on the one hand and the ground of defense on the other and merges both in a stat utory- indemnity fixed and certain. If the power to do away with a cause of action in any case exists at all in the exercise of the police power of the state, then the right of trial by jury is therefore no longer involved in such cases. The right of jury trial being incidental to the right of action, to destroy the one is to leave the other nothing upon which to operate." In his concurring opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Chadwick con cludes by saying: "Our decision upon