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The Green Bag

Parole. See Indeterminate Sentence. Penology. "When the Prisoner Returns." By O. F. Lewis. North American Review, v. 195, p. 479 (Apr.). "In the field of correctional institutions the American jail is the white man's burden. Has not the time come when the house should be put in order? So much for the institution that stands at the beginning of the crime ladder. Secondly now, how can we reduce the percent age of recidivism in crime? . . . By the exten sion of the indeterminate sentence along prac tical lines, and especially by the extension of the supervision of paroled prisoners." "An Ounce of Correction; a Pound of Cor ruption." By Julian Leavitt. American Maga zine, v. 73, p. 719 (Apr.). Discusses tuberculosis in prisons, and other evils largely due to the inefficiency of our manage ment of penal institutions. See Criminology, Indeterminate Sentence. Perpetuities. "The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell." By Charles Sweet (London). 12 Columbia Law Review 199 (Mar.). "It will be observed that in the opinion of the Real Property Commissioners, the reason why limitations of successive life estates to unborn descendants were held to be bad beyond the first generation, was that if they had been allowed they would have enabled land owners to create 'perpetuities,' or perpetual settlements of land in the nature of unbarrable entails, and if we compare this explanation with Mr. Fearne's explanation of the rule which we now call the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (1889, 42 Ch. D. 494, 1890, 44 Ch. D. 85) — namely, that if land is limited to an unborn person for life, with re mainder to his children, this last remainder is absolutely void, because it 'tends to a per petuity' — it is clear that the case referred to by Mr. Fearne is merely a specific example of the general rule, stated by the Real Property Commissioners, that the limitation of successive life estates in land to unborn descendants tends to create a perpetuity, or unbarrable entail, and is void, except as to the first generation." Pleadings. See Collateral Attack, Legal History. Principal and Surety. See Bankruptcy. Procedure. See Criminal Procedure. Professional Ethics. "The Shyster Law yer." By Ashley Cockrill. 21 Yale Law Jour nal 383 (Mar.). "The shyster is with us in large numbers. In this day of corporations and large monied inter ests he is perhaps more numerous and pros perous than in any previous period of the his tory of our profession. He certainly tends more largely than all other things to disgrace and deprave the profession of law. He is far more harmful to the profession itself than to the com munity in which he practises. He should be eliminated from the profession and banished from the bar. That cannot be accomplished

until public opinion condemns; and the public will never condemn until the bar itself does so." Real Property. See Perpetuities. Recall of Judges. "The Operation of the Recall in Oregon." By James D. Barnett. Amer ican Political Science Review, v. 6, p. 41 (Feb.). "Our experience is yet too limited to justify any general conclusion as to the operation of the recall in Oregon. It is often denounced in strong terms by its critics, although there is no serious thought of abolishing it. It is as often extravagantly praised by its friends; but, whatever are its merits, the democratic nature of the recall has very much more to do with its popularity than any practical results which it may have thus far accomplished." "The Recall." By Dean C. B. Seymour. 21 Yale Law Journal 372. (Mar.). "It is possible that this review of the history of Kentucky giving in detail the facts of political conflicts may show that the possibility of such violent changes is not a mere matter of theory, and that in the case of one great commonwealth vast injury would have been wrought had the right of Recall been entrusted to a body less stable than the body to which that power was entrusted by the Constitution." Res Judicata. "Res Judicata as a Federal Question." By Edwin H. Abbot, Jr. 25 Har vard Law Review 443 (Mar.). "1. The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction upon a writ of error to review a ruling by a state court as to the effect of a judgment of a federal court, or of a court of another state, of a territory, or of the District of Columbia, whether the error alleged be that too great or too little faith and credit was given to such judgment. "2. The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review and correct upon a writ or error a ruling by a state court that a judgment rendered in the same state or in a for eign country without jurisdiction binds and estops the appellant. "3. Assuming that a valid judgment bind ing upon the defendant has been rendered by a court of the state in which the judgment is drawn in question or of a foreign country, the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to review the effect given thereto as an estoppel, whether the alleged error be that too great or too little effect as an estoppel has been given." See Collateral Attack. Restraint of Trade. See Monopolies. Torts. See Defamation, Legal History. Wills. See Collateral Attack, Perpetuities. Workmen's Compensation. "A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, II." By Francis H. Bohlen. 25 Har vard Law Review 401 (Mar.). Contains a valuable and thorough treatment of the topic, "arising out of and in the course of employment."