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The Green Bag

been years behind its docket ever since I had been a member of the bar, that I was interested to ascertain the reason, and I found that for many years the Court had

preparation of written opinions giving pecially reasons for in the the aﬁ‘irmance conclusionsofreached, judgments, es—

refrained from writing opinions except

shall be discretionary; and the Court may, in its option, dispense therewith

in cases which in their judgment were

in such cases as it shall be so advised.

important as precedents.

This suggests that yourSupreme Court has held, in harmony with other states, that the requiring of written opinions as to its reasons in decisions was discre

I have been interested in observing that our legal brethren in Colorado are confronted with the same problems in regard to remedying the delays in the administration of justice and the relief of

your Supreme Court which have con fronted us in Missouri. I ﬁnd that your Supreme Court, though you have had

since the admission of the state to the Union the same reform code of procedure which has been adopted in other states, as in my own, is still some three years behind its docket. That has to me a fa~ miliar sound, as that same condition exists in Missouri, although we have had inter mediate appellate courts for many years, and a recent session of our legislature

established a third; not temporary as in your state in the recent act, but per manent. We also tried once, some twenty years ago, the experiment of commissions to assist the court in the writing of

opinions, and this same expedient has been resorted to by our last General Assembly. I cannot advise you from our experience that your remedy will be effectual, as we have found both of these remedies, that of intermediate courts and of commissions, ineffectual, though

they may seem to palliate the evils of the existing congestion. I am particu larly impressed with one provision of your act of the recent General Assembly, in relation to Courts of Review, which

tionary with the court.

This was un

doubtedly the rule at common

law.

Thus it was said by Lord Coke, Coke's Reports, Part III, pref. 5, "In the judicial records of the King's Courts, the reasons or causes of the judgments are not ex pressed, but wise and learned men do, before they judge, labor to reach to the

depth of all the reasons of the case in question, but in their judgment express

not any; and, in truth, if judges should set down the reasons and causes of their judgment within every record, that im

mense labor should withdraw them from the necessary service of the Common

wealth, and their records should grow to be like Elephantini Libri, of inﬁnite length, and in mine opinion, lose some what of their present authority and reverence; and this is also worthy for learned and grave men to imitate.”

If my Lord Coke had this apprehen sion of the Elephann'm' Libri in the mea

gre libraries of his time, what would he have thought could he have looked centuries ahead and foreseen the many thousands of law books which are now

searched for judicial precedents?

Well

may he consider his words, that these records would lose some of their present authority and reverence.

tion. Thus it is provided in section 7 of

Blackstone says on this subject (Book I, p. 71), that the reports are histories of the several cases, with a short summary of the proceedings which are preserved at

the act referred to, with reference to the proposed Court of Appeals, that the

both sides and the reasons of the Court

indicates, and may be effective, that its

framers had a clear perception of the causes of the evils of the present situa

large in the record, the arguments of