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The Green Bag

"This ‘elasticity’ objection must be considered by every one who supports codiﬁcation in any form, but for the purposes of a Criminal Code it is completely irrelevant. Arguments may be found to su port the roposition that it is desir able that t e Law 0 Contracts should be in a state of movement and uncertainty, but no one could support such a roposition with regard to the Law of Crimes. he Court of Star Chamber may have performed a useful function as a Court of Criminal Equity in the days of the Tudors, but the days when criminal equity would be tolerated by the community belong to past centuries. . . . As far as human ability can make it so, there should be no room for doubt as to whether any particular acts consti tute a criminal offense or not. And the greatest step that can be taken in furtherance of this object is to codify the Criminal Law." See Law Writing, Negotiable Instruments. Contingent Fees. "The Contingent Fee." By F. C. Wilkinson. 72 CentralLaw Journal 335 (May 12).

“The abuse of the contingent fee comes not so much in theory as in ractice. It relates to the amount of the fee. his is an abuse that no amount of technical rules will obviate. Yet there must be some supervision of these possible arsonious cases. It appears that our only answer to the roblem can be, ‘Allow the court to super vise al contingent fee contracts.’ Here are a few of the reasons why the court should exercise such jurisdiction: — "l. Parties to this contract are not at arm's length. Similar conditions exist as in a contract between a shipper and a railroad company. The parties are in a position where unfair advantage may be easily taken, and it is the duty of the court to interfere in such cases. "2. Public policy demands a change. Scandal is frequently caused by the exorbitant exaction of fees. Respect for the law is lowered with respect to the bar. "3. The attorney is the oflicer of the court. He is in the nature a public oﬂicial, and in many resgects his employment is a public duty. The rig t to charge fees comes from the court, and the court should regulate that right. "4. It would be in accord with the law of attorney and client. These parties are in a certain ﬁduciary relation, that the courts are accustomed to deal in accord with equitable principles.

"5. A reasonable contingent fee may be obtained better this way than any other. The court's adjudication of such cases in the past has proved its efficiency." Contracts. See Corporations, Liquidated Damages. Contributory Dependency. See Juvenile Delinquency. Conveyancing. See Real Property, Torrens System. Copyright. "The Copyright Bill, 1911." By G. Herbert Thring. Fortnightly Review, v. 89, p. 901 (May). '

“There is no fear as to international relations. These are ﬁxed ﬁrmly and favorably in the Berlin Convention. As far as Amerim is con cerned, it can only be hoped that with the growth of years will come the growth of wisdom, and ence that to thetrade Senate, unions, abandoning will facethe theslavish matterobedi~ fairly and squarely, and legislate without restrictions, not only for their own, but for the authors of other countries, and will join the Berlin Conven tron.

“At the present time, however, and in the near future, the real issue lies with the Colonies and with the Government's relations with the Colo nies. indeed, this has been the crux of the situa tion for many years; but now that separate copyright legislation has been proclaimed the real crisis is at hand." Corporations. “Has the Common Law Re ceived the Fiction Theory of Corporations?" By Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart. 27 Law Quar terly Review 219 (Apr.).

A learned and notable article, reviewing at length from the ﬁfteenth century the decisions bearing on the subject. “No one who is familiar with the English judicial mind will be surprised at the scantiness of sitive utterances on a question of this high 0rd: of generality. The nearest approach to such an utterance that l have found within our own time is twenty-one ears old and occurs in a judgment of the late r. Justice Cave, a learned and thoughtful la er. Counsel had argued that certain reti members of an insolvent building society were liable, notwith standing their retirement, to contribute to the payment of its debts. The precise question turned on the interpretation of special enact ments, the terms of which have no interest for

our present purpose. But as to the general principles involved the learned judge said: ‘A corporation is a legal persona, just as much as an individual; and, if a man trustsa corpora

tion, he trusts that legal persona, and must look to its assets for yment: he can only call upon individual mem rs to contribute in case the Act or charter has so provided.’ No such word is here as ‘ﬁction’ or ‘ﬁctitious,' not even ‘arti ﬁcial.‘ It is true that no formal theory was be fore the Court at all: it is probable that Mr. Justice Cave was not thinking of the controversy between ﬁctionists and realists; it is possible that he had never heard of it. Still, do we trust a Fiction? and is a Fiction ‘just as much’ a rson as a real man? I do not know what in erence a Continental jurist might be tempted to draw from the admission that an Act of Parliament or royal charter may displace the usual presumption, universila: debet singuh' non debent. In this country there is no doubt since Blackstone's time, some would say since Sir Thomas Smith's, that the legislative

competence of Parliament is unlimited, and there has never been any that the King's discretion as to the terms of the charters he is pleased to grant is very large. An English lawyer will therefore draw no speculative inference at all. “On the other hand, we may certainly ﬁnd Lord Selborne saying in 1872 that a railway