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The Green Bag

the work of many men perhaps widely separated. The courts require the often impossible task of proving every ste of such a process, with the result that an otherwise good case cannot be established in court." "Harmless Error." By Judge Needham C. Collier.

72 CentralLaw Journal 151 (Mar. 3).

Ur ing that the bill advocated by the Ameri can ar Association should provide, not that all error be eliminated from consideration in an appellate court except that which "has resulted in a miscarriage of justice," but “That on an appeal the respondent's right to a jury trial on questions of fact should never be impaired without his consent, and, if error

which militated against appellant's right to a fair jury trial is found in the record, the court should nevertheless not remand without re spondent being ﬁrst allowed to demand that the appellate court render the verdict it thinks the jury should have rendered."

"The Administration ofJustice — Its Speeding and Cheapening." By William Howard Taft. 72 Central Law Journal 191 (Mar. 17).

A reprint of his ar ument made some time ago before the Virginia ar Association.

accurate knowledge of what he was talking about, and the statement related to a matter of business in regard to which action was to be expected. every moral reason exists for holding the de fendant liable. . . . "There seems no reason whatever for not hold ing a defendant for the natural consequences of his actions when the question involved relates to tort as well as when it relates to contract.

In the formation of contracts the rties are rightly held to the natural meaning 0 what they say. It can only be the idea, induced by the words ‘fraud’ and ‘deceit,’ that conscious dis

honesty is necessary which can have brought about a diﬂerent result in an action of tort." "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." By Francis H. Bohlen. 59 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 373 (Mar.). In this, the second of three instalments, the

rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is discussed particu larly with reference to the subject of riparian rights, and differences between the policy of English and American jurisprudence are pointed out. Uniformity of Law. "The Relation of Judicial Procedure to Uniformity of Law." By Thomas W. Shelton.

Editorial Review, v. 4,

See Criminal Procedure. p. 249 (Mar.). Referendum.

See

Direct

Government.

Tort. "Liability for Honest Misrepresenta tion." By Prof. Samuel Williston. 24 Harvard Law Review 415 (Apr.).

One of the most notable articles of the month, marked by great clearness of analysis-it will repaly a careful reading. “ he real issue,. . . constantly obscured by

the terminology of the subject,. . . is no less than this: When a defendant has induced another to act by representations false in fact though not dishonestly made, and damage has directly resulted from the action taken, who should bear the loss? “In considering which doctrine is the better, consideration should be given chieﬂy to two ‘things. First: logical consistency with itself in all parts of the law governing misre resenta tion. Secondly: the inherent justice 0 the rule proposed.

That the law of misrepresentation

as laid down in Derry v. Peek is hopelessly in consistent with the law governing misrepre sentation when relied on as the basis of warranty

or estoppel, can hardly be denied. Adherence to what may be regarded as established English doctrine in deceit, estop l and warranty is absolutely illogical, and with simpliﬁed pleading becomes nearly, if not quite, impossible. It IS a just ground of reproach to the law if a harmonious doctrine cannot be developed. "The inherent justice of the severer rule of liability which in some cases at least holds a speaker liable for damages for false representa tions, though his intentions were innocent and his statements honestly intended, is equally clear. However honest his state of mind, he has induced another to act, and damage has been

thereby caused. If it be added that the plaintiff had just reason to attribute to the defendant

"We must go further than making the laws uniform. Judicial procedure must also be uniform, simple, cheap and expeditious. . . . "President Amasa M. Eaton, of Rhode Island,

reported to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at Detroit in August. 1909, that though this statute [the Negotiable Instruments Act] had been adopted in thirty-eight states and territories and in the District of Columbia, some of the courts were destroying its purpose by lack of uniformity in decision. These courts had simply failed to recognize and permit to become operative the announced cooperation of thirty-eight Legislatures in enacting identical laws in matters of common interest to commerce, ﬁnance and society. . . . “So, if it be necessary for uniformity, why can not the judges or the presiding judges, of the different state a pellate courts exchange views when a new unii’orm statute is enacted, and if they fail to agree upon its meaning, let the majority rule? A Congress of Courts, I venture to suggest, is within the spirit of uniformity. . . . “It is not too much to say that upon uniform judicial procedure and decision largely depends the fostering of closer political, commercial and social relations among the states. The best ractitioner in Virginia today is lost in a New ork or a North Carolina Court, and vice versa. This is as devoid of reason as it is unneighborly. There should be no more excuse than for speaking differing languages. "But who shall perform this important work of preparing a ﬁxed system and permanent rules for the regulation of judicial procedure? There is but one answer -— the highest Appellate Court in the United States and of the several states, until all the states shall adopt the federal plan. The bar stands ready to render such practical assistance as may be found convenient