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The Election of United States Senators protection of property are the under lying motives of all social organization. The guaranty of such is found in an upper, the creation and development of

personal rights and property in a lower House. No matter how a select council is

created, whether by appointment of the state executive or selection by the state

legislative authority, it must when necessary act as a check to popular encroachment upon fundamental or constitutional rights.

Caesar, after he

became dictator, exercised the partic ularly important right of nominating Senators, but, having the power of nomination, the ofiice of Senator be came dead as to him, for it was conceded

that its work did not apply to the Imperator——which meant the con centration and perpetuation of oﬂ‘icial power in his hands. I by no means assert that when Caesar absorbed the whole government it was a bad step for the Roman people; but we are not yet ready for an lmperator, although the present movement, if successful,

so that when one branch leans it is

instantly held up by another. The Senate is endowed with wisdom and strength to resist all innovations of fundamental rights. It is just and necessary, therefore, that the power of

appointment of Senators should be lifted out of the chaos and tumult of popular election and lodged in a different body. The member of the House represents the people of a small district, and of the Senate the whole state, and

all of the people therein.

If the people

are neglectful or undiscriminating in the election of representatives to the legislatures, they will be equally so in their choice of

Senators.

Cannot

the

people

trust

themselves to exercise the same care in choosing their state legislators as

they would in the selection of Senators? The alleged reform is then nothing less than a stab at the people themselves —at their intelligence and discrimina tion. This argument has never been, and never can be answered. Besides,

the deprivation of the legislatures of the power to elect Senators would be a direct and powerful blow at the morale of these

will be a large advance in that direction. But whether we have a Caesar in the

bodies. It would be in effect the destruc

Executive, or whether we have a Caesar in the Congress separate or united, con

tion of their usefulness. It is an un founded and undiscriminating assault

centrating and perpetuating all power in its hands, either is equally distasteful to our political education and incon gruous in our free institutions. No government can exist where the people exercise

capricious

power

any

more

than one can exist where the Executive is a despot.

JOIN A POPULAR EXECUTIVE

WITH A POPULAR LEGISLATIVE BODY, FOR THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CoN STITUTION, AND WHAT REMAINS or THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED BY THE CoN STITUTION?

The

best

government

is

that in which the checks and balances are properly and equally regulated—

upon forty-eight legislative bodies en bloc.

It is argued that the state legis

latures often have “deadlocks" and that their time is frequently misapplied or wasted in an effort to elect a Senator,

and that in the interim the state loses representation in the United States Senate. With great respect, this is a matter for

the

individual

states

to

settle. It is purely a question of internal policy. Political manhood, state politics, religion or economy may be involved and the internal strife may be carried on to settle a great principle. It may be thoughtful and patriotic for the United States Senate to suggest to a state thus