Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 23.pdf/238

 212

The Green Bag

minds their justification has not been convinc ing." In announcing the decision in the Official Classiﬁcation territory case, Commissioner Prouty made these two observations: — "First, it has been several times stated in the

course of this discussion, and should be repeated here, that in view of the complex character of

this problem nothing but an actual test can satis factorily determine the ﬁnancial results from the operations of these several carriers. There is no evidence before us which establishes the necessity for higher rates. The probability is that increased rates will not be necessary in the future. In view of the liberal return received by these defendants in the past ten years they should be required to show, with reasonable cer tainty, the necessity before the increase is allowed. If actual results should demonstrate that our forecast of the future is wrong, there might be ground for asking a further considera tion of this subject. "But it would be further said that before any general advance can be permitted it must appear with reasonable certainty that carriers have exercised proper economy in the purchase

of their supplies, in the payment of their wages, and in the general conduct of their business. "Second, we have been compelled to dis pose of this case upon the evidence available. As previously noted, there is no testimony tending to show the cost of reproducing these properties. It is plain that a physical valuation would introduce into the calculation a new element, which might lead to a different con clusion.

The conclusion reached here extends,

therefore, no further than the facts upon which it is based." Railway Rates. Expensive Managemenlwill not Justify Higher Rates. U. S. That “expensive management" on the part of a railroad company "will not justify higher rates to pay expenses and dividends to stockholders," is declared in an opinion recently rendered at Carson, Nev., in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Nevada, Circuit Judge W. W. Morrow, and District Judges E. S. Farrington and W. C. Van Fleet sitting, in which the Court refused to enjoin the Railroad Commissioners for the State of Nevada from enforcing the provisions of an order ﬁxing joint rates for the transportation of forest products in carload lots from Verdi to Tonopah and Goldﬁeld. The orders were attacked on the usual ground that they were unjust and confiscatol’y and tended to deprive the complaining railroad companies

of their property without due process of law, and, in the case of the Southern Pacific Company,

that they interfered with interstate commerce. In two cases, Woodside v. Tonopah 8: Goldﬁeld R. R. Co. and Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad Commission of Nevada, Judge Morrow delivered the opinion of the Court and held that “the rates ﬁxed by the Railroad Commission are reasonable and just, and ought to be fairly remunerative," and refused a temporary in junction. The Court said: "The Railroad Commission has presented to us a statement of the expenses of the Tonopah & Goldﬁeld Railroad as com pared with the Nevada Northern Railway. The two roads are in Nevada and have many features in common. It appears that the Tonopah & Goldﬁeld Road is under very expensive manage ment as compared with the Nevada Northern Railroad, and that it is very much in excess for substantially the same service. Such expensive management, under the circumstances, will not justify higher rates to pay expenses and dividends to stockholders." Retroactive Laws. Kentucky Blanket Grant: Cases —Ex Post Facto Laws Invalid Only when they Relate to Criminal Punishment: — Taxation. The titles to a large tract of land in Kentucky were litigated in Kentucky Union Co. v. Ken lucky and two other cases in the federal Supreme Court, which were tried together and decided Jan. 3 in favor of the commonwealth of Ken tucky. These lands were granted by the state of Virginia before Kentucky was admitted to the Union, to patentees who had never taken possession, and practically no taxes had been paid on them up to the passage of the Kentucky Act of 1906, which provided for the assessment of taxes for the ﬁve years preceding and for forfeiture in the event of non-payment of such taxes. The defendants argued that the statute in question was ex post faclo legislation and, as such, unconstitutional. This argument was overruled by Mr. Justice Day, who said: — "Laws of a retroactive nature, imposing taxes or providing remedies for their assessment and collection, and not impairing vested rights, are not forbidden by the federal Constitution. League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156, 46 L. ed. 478, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475. This court had occasion in a very early case to consider the meaning of an ex post facio law as the term is used in the federal Constitution, prohibiting the states from passing any law of that character. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386-390, 1 L. ed. 648-650. In