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 Latest Important Cases charged with keeping the track in repair. The Court, Mr. Justice Lurton delivering the opinion, held (1) that the statute was not re

pugnant to that clause of the Fourteenth Amend ment which guarantees to every person the

equal protection of the laws, and (2) another statute of Mississippi, making proof of injury inﬂicted by the running of locomotives or cars prima facie evidence of negligence, does not deny the equal protection of the laws nor due process of law. Patents. Selden Patent on Gasolene Automo bites —Forced Construction of the Patent Cannot be Adapted. U. S. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision Jan. 10 reversing a decision returned by United States Judge Hough on Sept. 15, 1909 (21 Green Bag 534), and over throwing the suit brought by the holders of the famous Selden automobile patent against C. A. Duerr & Co., the Ford Motor Company, the O. I. Gude Company, Panhard & Levasseur, the Société Anonyrne des Anciens, Andrew Masser bal, John Wanamaker and others concerned in the automobile industry which sought to enforce a claim of infringement against all the defendants. The patent was obtained on Nov. 5, 1895, by George B. Selden, for an improved road engine. The opinion of the Court, written by Judge Noyes, said in part:

“While the conclusion of non~infringement which we have reached leaves the patentee empty-handed with respect to the patent for the short time it has to run, it cannot be regarded as depriving him through any technicality of the just reward of his labors. He undoubtedly appre ciated the possibilities of the motor vehicle at a time when his ideas were regarded as chimerical. Had he been able to see far enough he might have taken out a patent as far reaching as the circuit court held this one was. "The Bray-ton engine was the leading engine at the time, and his attention was naturally drawn to its supposed advantages. He chose that type. In the light of events, we can see that had he appreciated the superiority of the Otto engine and adapted that type for his com bination his patent would cover the modern automobile. He did not do so. He made the wrong choice, and we cannot. by placing any forced construction upon the patent or by straining

the

doctrine

of equivalents,

make

another choice for him at the expense of these defendants, who neither legally nor morally owe him anything." Taxation. See Interstate Commerce.

155

Torrens System. Validity of California Statute Providing for Quieting of Titles—-State has Power to Legislate Regarding Registered Titles — Fourteenth Amendment. U. 5. After the San Francisco earthquake, the Cali fomia legislature enacted a statute designed to afford relief from the possible injustice arising from the destruction of public records by the conﬂagration. This statute (c. 59 of 1906) pro vided for the quieting of titles by means of a special form of action brought in the Superior Court of the county in which the property is situate. One Zeiss brought such an action, obtaining a judgment of the Superior Court removing the cloud on his title. The defendant company appealed. On certiﬁcate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals two questions came before the Supreme Court of the United States, namely (1) whether the state had authority to deal with the subject embraced in the statute, (2) whether the act was repug nant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Both questions were answered in the negative in American Land Co. v. Zeiss, decided Jan. 3.

On the former question Mr. Justice White, who delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, said: "As it is indisputable that the general welfare of society is involved in the se curity of the titles to real estate and in the public registry of such titles, it is obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects inherea in the very nature of government. This being true, it follows that government possesses the power to remedy the confusion and uncertainty as to registered titles arising from a disaster like that described by the court below." The Court thought the foregoing proposition self-evident, but as the question of the power of the court is intimately interwoven with that of the suﬁiciency of the procedure adopted, reviewed a number of leading cases which show conclusively that such power can unquestionably be legally exercised under such circumstances as those of the case in hand. On the second point, also, the statute was upheld, the Court saying: uTo argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause because a case may be con ceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of conceiv able injury, but the just and reasonable char acter of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals."