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 Reviews of Books argue that there can be any law in the absence of constraint. A man, we will suppose, is under a certain obligation;

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questions of legal theory, the views of Austin and of the late James C. Carter oorning in for a large share of the author's

if he is constrained by the state to fulﬁll

attention, and those of numerous other

the obligation it is a legal obligation, if he is not so constrained it can be no more than a moral obligation. Kor kunov argues that his fulﬁllment of the legal obligation may be voluntary, hence constraint cannot be essential. Such a voluntary attitude, however,

juristic writers being criticized from a

does not imply that a man's so acting precludes the existence of constraint,

for he may perceive it to exist and choose not to resist it. It does not cease to be a constrained obligation simply because

point of view which suggests specializa tion in the law as a particular science

and profession rather than broad philo sophical study, and everywhere bears evidence of the hard-headed assimila tion of facts by a mind of ripe legal scholarship.

The author relies largely on illustra tions for the presentation of his points, and the profusion of his examples drawn from a large fund of juristic learning

it is discharged voluntarily. Constraint exists none the less, whether met with consent or with resistance. Moreover,

defect, for the attention of one employing

the constraint which is fundamental

such a method may easily be distracted

to law need not be actually exercised;

from delicate abstract analysis to the clumsier practical means of testing reﬁnements of speculation. Prof. Gray, we say with due deference, could hardly claim to have employed throughout an analytical rather than an empirical method. The value of his contribution is most conspicuous when he is examin ing the theories of Austin or Carter in the light of actual facts drawn from a

it is suﬁiciently real because there is the possibility of its exercise and it may be brought into play at any time by resorting to the proper agencies of compulsion.

Having abolished constraint, Kor kunov is aware that he needs some notion

to take its place, to differentiate law from morality, so he adopts the subli

gives the'book a concreteness and vigor all its own.

This quality may have its

mated conception of a command (p. 169).

study of historical and current con

This really involves a latent inconsist ency, for obviously where there is no power to constrain there can be no

power to command. By denying that there is any constraint we are destroying

ditions. Its value is also in evidence when he is discussing such a question as that whether our courts make the law or merely interpret and declare it. In the higher realms of speculation, how

the authority and the sanction of law —

ever, as for example where he is con

it can no longer be a command.

sidering the nature of rights and duties

GRAY’S NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW

in the abstract, Professor Gray’s skill in elucidating a subject by means of concrete illustrations is of little aid,

The Nature and Sources of the Law. By John Chipman Gray. LL.D.. Royall Professor of Law in Harvard University. Columbia University Press. New York. Pp. xii. 292+ appendices and inda 40. ($1.50 an.)

he seems too readily to fall into the

and we may be pardoned for saying that

HIS book, made up of the Carpentier

danger of confusing substantive with remedial rights.

lectures given at Columbia Uni versity in 1908, discusses fundamental

proportionate attention to the metaphy

While the book perhaps devotes dis