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The Green Bag

sisting in each case entrusted to them

I have said that the most important

that their clients shall have the beneﬁt of all the statutory rights which the legislature has provided. Suitors are entitled to the rights the law gives them. They are entitled to have their counsel assert those rights and to have

thing of all toward re-enthroning the principle of simplicity and directness in attaining the ends of justice is that we ourselves shall observe that principle in determining the standards of conduct

courts award them.

I do insist, how

ever, that the law ought to be such that what a suitor is bound to do or to suffer

by way of means or preliminaries lead ing to a ﬁnal decision on the merits of his case, should be determined, as far as possible, by the common-sense require

ments of that particular case, and as little as possible by compliance or fail ure to comply with detailed and techni cal statutory requirements designed to cover ten thousand different cases as well as his. I do insist that, notwith standing the many just decisions ren dered by our courts, when we consider

the prevalent delay, the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort and money, the hindrance of just rights through long-continued defensive liti gation without substantial merit, the

litigants who abandon their pursuit of justice through weariness or lack of

at the bar. No system will work well unless it is applied in good faith. Even though we may escape in a great meas ure from the statutory restrictions which now hamper the courts in applying the

rule of justice in the particular case to the proceedings in that case, the rule cannot be successfully applied unless the sentiment of the profession——the

public opinion of the bar-makes con formity to that rule a requirement of honorable obligation. What I have in mind may be illus trated by reference to two proposed pro

visions which have been much favored by our committees and which, it seems to me, should ﬁnd their place among the simple and fundamental provisions of any system of procedure.

One is, the

provision that in every case a day shall be given when the parties, through their counsel, may come before a judicial ofﬁcer informally for a rule regulating

means, the citizens who abandon their

the further procedure in the case, cover

rights rather than incur the annoying and injurious incidents of litigation in the effort to enforce them, the embolden ing of the unscrupulous in whose hands

ing the whole ground of pleadings, bills of particulars, discovery of documents, deposition of witnesses, mode of trial, etc. —the so-called omnibus summons

delay and diﬁiculty and expense of liti

provision.

gation are weapons with which to force

ful substitute for the separate, succes sive motions under special statutory

compromise

without

just

grounds—

when we consider all these incidents of our present condition we are bound to

say that the general interests of the administration of the law require a thorough and radical change. The situation cannot be met by merely increasing the judicial force. We have often tried that expedient, but always ineffectually. The only real remedy is to be found in reforming the System.

This would be a most use

provisions now permitted, yet I can well see that its effectiveness could be largely destroyed if the bar generally were to

attempt to evade it instead of accepting in good faith the opportunities which it would afford. The other provision is, that no error of ruling upon the admission or rejection

of evidence or otherwise in a trial, shall be ground for reversal unless it appears