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award, and state it aﬂirmatively rather than negatively, without changing its substance. Then, if we substitute determination of the

reasonableness of the regulations by im partial authority for determination by com mon accord, and leave out the American

demand for the concurrence of the United States in their enforcement, the contention would assume the following form :— “The exercise of such liberty is subject to such limitations or restraint by Great Britain,

Canada, or Newfoundland as are

appropriate and necessary for the protection and preservation of the common rights in such ﬁsheries, and as may be reasonable in

themselves and fair as between local ﬁshermen and ﬁshermen coming from the United States, and not so framed as to give an advantage to the former over the latter. and in so far as their appropriateness, necessity, reason ableness, and fairness may be determined by an impartial authority." Such, in substance, is the actual ruling of

the Hague Tribunal on Question 1. The other important point, that in Question 5, relating to the three-mile territorial limit,

was decided in favor of Great Britain, along the lines of the construction repeatedly insisted on by that power. The holding is: "The tribunal decides and awards that in case of bays the three marine miles are to be measured from a straight line drawn across the body of water at the place where it ceases to have the conﬁguration and characteristics of a bay. At all other places the three marine miles are to be measured following the sinuosities of the coast." And recommenda tions are offered, “for the consideration and acceptance of the high contracting parties," that the straight line shall be drawn at the point nearest the entrance to the bay where the width does not exceed ten miles, and that in certain cases the line be drawn between speciﬁed headlands recognizable as the limits of the bay under average conditions. The other points decided were the follow ing: Question 2, the United States has the right to employ others than citizens or resi dents of the United States in the ﬁsheries; Questions 3 and 4, United States ﬁshermen are exempt from inconvenient or discriminatory lighthouse dues to the Newfoundland govern

ment, or obligations to enter at custom houses

in

Labrador

and

Newfoundland;

Question 6, the words "bay, harbors, and

creeks" in the treaty referring to Labrador

apply equally to the treaty coasts of New foundland; Question 7, inhabitants of the United States are entitled to commercial privileges on treaty coast accorded by agree ment or otherwise to United States trading vessels generally, when the treaty liberty of ﬁshing and the commercial privileges are not exercised concurrently. Respondent Superior. Liability of Re ligious or Charitable Corporations for Torts of Their Servants——/lnalogy of Private Trust Estates Afford: No Foundation for Doctrine of Immunity. N. Y. A journeyman mechanic brought suit against the Salvation Army for personal injuries occasioned by the defective condi tion of a staging belonging to the defendant, which argued that being a religious or chari table corporation it could not be held liable for the torts or negligence of its servants or agents. The New York Court of Appeals, however, declined to accept this view, and unanimously gave judgment sustaining the plaintiﬂ's right of action. Chief Judge Cullen in his opinion reviewed the authorities at some length, and declared :— “In many jurisdictions the immunity [i.e., that of religious and charitable corporations from the operation of the rule respondent superior] is unqualiﬁed, existing in all cases, but the extent of the immunity and the grounds on which it rests are the subject of very diverse judicial views. Where the doctrine that the immunity is universal obtains, it is rested on the proposition that the funds of the corporation are the subject of a charitable trust, and that to suﬁ’er a

judgment to be recovered against the cor poration, and to subject its property to the judgment would be an illegal diversion and waste of the trust estate. This doctrine has been asserted in Pennsylvania (Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 624), Maryland

(Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20), Tennessee (Abtsein v. I/Valdon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24), Kentucky (Williamson v. Louis ville lllission, etc., School, 95 Ky. 251),

Illinois (Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 385), and Missouri (Adams v. Uni versity Hospital, 99 S. W. Rep. 453). In Massachusetts the exemption of certain hospitals from liability seems by the opinions of the Supreme Court to have been based rather on the theory that those institutions were governmental instrumentalities than on their character as public charities, though