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 The Green Bag

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assignable and which are not choses either in possession or in action.

To sum up: The word “Thing" in English and

American Jurisprudence

has a meaning broader than the popular use and much narrower than the Roman use of the word. And the word “Action" as used technically and properly in the English law has a broader and a

at this day would seriously consider treating the law relating to actions and procedure as a subdivision of Things. While it is true that some accrued causes or rights of action are in a sense

property, causes of action arise by reason of events other than the primary or substantive rights or relations, via, by transactions, conduct and events

different meaning from the word “Thing" or “Chose in Action" even.

sufficiently distinct in nature to justify

The idea “Actions" is diﬁerent from even “Chose in Action" or “Right of Action" and includes procedure, but does not include all remedies. Dr. Hammond has pointed out the fact that Blackstone's most important

of Actions devoted to Procedure Proper,

a distinct division. That part of the law

via, Pleading, Practice and Evidence, is too widely diﬁerent from “Things" to be regarded in any sense as of the same nature.

“justice,” it has been said, “is the great interest of mankind." It is at

discrimination has been followed by nearly all the civilians of the last century, quoting Professor Windscheid as afﬁrm

once the cause and the end of law. Its

ing that Savigny's inﬂuence has made

existence

a great change in the doctrine of passes sion and consequently in the view of

establishments are instruments and Actions the means in its administration,

rights as objective or capable of posses

justice is the object of all vital law.

establishment is the reason for the

of

governments.

Judicial

sion, saying: AMERICAN TRADITIONS Savigny limits the doctrine of possession of rights connected with external things, ex cluding those of personal status and obliga tions. This is a mere corollary to the change instituted by Blackstone almost half a cen tury earlier. But the fullest conﬁrmation of Blacsktone's change will be found in the classification adopted by all the most recent civilians. None of them, so far as our knowl edge extends,

adhere to the old

The traditions and conceptions of

the profession insofar as they concern the general framework of law should be regarded, and as there are those who

regard the division into Public and Private law as connected with our traditions, it may be useful to determine

division

that by actual illustration. advocated by Austin, in which the Law of Things comprehends the entire law, except the mere description of status. All of them have a class of personal rights, corresponding more or less closely to those in Blackstone's First Book. Some go further and recognize a. distinct class which not only belong to persons, but constitute, so to speak, a part of the personality. They have no objects, at least no objects “unconnected with the person," and yet are rights in rem as distinct from obligations.“

In view of the history of English Law and of American Law as well, no one 50 Sandars' Justinian. Introduction. 1):.

The follow

ing is typical of the universal habit. Upon the recommendation of Gov. Yates of New York an Act was passed in 1824 appointing James Kent (Chancel lor, retired), Erasmus Root (President

of the Senate), and Benjamin F. Butler (Attorney-General and Secretary of War

under President Jackson, and District Attorney under Van Buren) a Com

mission of Statutory Revision. Kent declining, his place was ﬁlled by John Duer, and General Root resigning, Henry Wheaton succeeded. In the