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The Green Bag

concerns that sale or transportation. If the second section of the act prohibits every attempt to monopolize any part of inter state commerce, it forbids all competition therein and defeats the only purpose of the law, for there can be no competition unless each competitor is permitted to attempt to draw to himself and thereby to monopolize some part of the commerce. This is not, it cannot be, the proper interpretation of this section. It must be so construed as to abate the mischief it was passed to destroy and to promote the remedy it provided. It was enacted, not to stifle, but to foster, com

petition, and its true construction is that while unlawful means to monopolize and to continue an unlawful monopoly of interstate and international commerce are misdemeanors and enjoinable under it, monopolies of part of interstate and international commerce by legitimate competition, however success ful, are not denounced by the law and may not be forbidden by the courts. Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 60 C. C. A. 290, 298, 125 Fed. 454, 462; Phillips v. Iola Portland

Cement Co., 61 C. C. A. 19, 20, 125, Fed. 593, 594." Monopolies. Restraint of Trade Illegal only when Direct and Substantial—Combina lion Between Corporation and its Officer or Agent Cannot be Formed by Thoughts or Acts of Only One Person. U. S. In the United States Circuit Court of Ap peals, Judge Sanborn handed down a de cision at St. Paul Nov. 19 which had points of resemblance to the opinion which he wrote in the Standard Oil case. Thus the principle that competition must be directly and sub stantially, not indirectly and incidentally restricted, to put a combination under the ban of the Sherman

Act, was

re-asserted.

On the facts of the case, however, judgment was given in favor of the defendants. U. S. v. Union Paciﬁc Coal Co., ct al. "A coal company engaged in mining and selling its coal is not prohibited by the Anti Trust act or by the law from refusing to sell its coal, from selecting its customers, from ﬁxing the price and terms. . . . “A combination between a corporation and its officer or agent in violation of the Anti-Trust act cannot be formed by the thoughts or acts of the oﬂicer or agent alone, without the conscious participation in it of

any other officer or agent of the corporation. "The union of two 0!‘ more persons, the

conscious participation of two or more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful combination."

wun and Administration.

When Income

of Life Beneficiary Begins to Accrue—- No Distinction between Legacy of Speciﬁc Property and Bequest of Residuum or Aliquot Part Thereof. Ill. In a controversy with regard to the effect of the will of Marshall Field, the question

before the court was whether the daughter of the deceased was entitled to an apportion ment of the income accruing to the estate from its personal investments for the period intervening between the death of the testator and the date of the distribution of the trust funds in which, under the terms of the will,

she was interested. The Probate Court of Cook County, Ill., answered the question in the affirmative in Matter of the estate of Mar shall Field (Chicago Legal News, Dec. 11), saying in part :— "It is contended by the executors that there is a distinction between a legacy of speciﬁc property to trustees for the use of the bene ﬁciary, for life with remainder over, and a similar bequest of the residuum or an aliquot part thereof. Such distinction has been recognized in one state only (Welsh v. Brown, 14 Vroom [N. 1.] 37,) and the New Jersey cases seem to form an exception to the general doctrine of the American decisions. There are certain English cases also which, while not speciﬁcally in point, seem to maintain the distinction and are perhaps fairly inter pretable as holding that the rule as to a residuary legacy does not apply in the case of a speciﬁc legacy for life with remainder over. See Loumdes v. Lowndes, 15 Vesey 301; Gibson v. Bott, 7 Vesey‘Jr. 89. “On the other hand there are numerous American cases which seem to support the proposition that there is no appreciable dis tinction between the two classes of legacies and that the reason for permitting the life tenant of the legacy with remainder over to a third party to receive the income from the date of the death of the testator is perhaps even stronger in the case of one who receives such speciﬁc legacy as against one who re ceived a portion of the residuum. . . . “If then the will is itself silent as to the time when the income derived from the personal estate shall begin to accrue to the use of the life beneﬁciary, the overwhelming weight of authority is that it begins at the date of the death of the testator."