Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 22.pdf/372

 350

The Green Bag

ever source derived’ the possibility, if not the probability, of the Supreme Court holding that income from state securities ma be taxed. Senator Root answers that i? the amendment is construed in the light of political and judicial history there is no danger of such construction. . . . “Senator Root has earned the reputation of measuring carefully his words. Is the fore going statement one upon which he can stand?" In the Pollock case, "the Court apparently a reed with counsel that it was the intention 0 Congress to tax state and municipal securi ties. . . . But there was no tax levied upon state and municipal bonds unless the words ‘from any source whatever‘ included such securities. . . . Unless the Supreme Court has changed its mind since 1894, is there not a stron probability that it will hold that the words‘ rom whatever source derived‘ mean what the words ‘from any other source what ever‘ then meant? . . . "What, then, is the solution? In em hasiz ing the point of diﬁerence between nator Root and Governor Hughes let us not over look their points of agreement. They both evidentl believe that the majority decision in the ollock case was unfortunate. Neither is impressed with the ar ment that the right to tax incomes sho d be reserved to the states. Neither shrinks from the added burden that might be thrown u 11 their own State of New York if the federa Government should be given the power of levying an income tax in a practicable way. “Does not the history of the direct tax clause suggest the form of amendment? Why not strike out the words ‘and direct taxes’ from article I, section 2, clause 3? Also strike out the words ‘or other direct tax’ from article 1, section 9, clause 4. Insert in article I, section 8, clause 1, the word ‘taxes’ before the word ‘duties,’ to the end that taxes,

so pleased with our century of experience with the blind that we must try another cent with the one-eyed leading the blind?" "Shall the Income Tax Amendment Be Ratiﬁed?" By Norris Brown, United States Senator from Nebraska. Editorial Review, v. 2, p. 354 (Apr.). "From every standpoint this nation should be clothed with every power necessary to protect itself and to maintain itself under all circumstances and under all possible dangers. To deny this proposition is to put our nation at a disadvantage with every other civilized nation of the glo ." “Third Degree.” See Administration of

as well as duties, imposts and excises shall be

a man's business, profession, or occupation,

uniform. The practical effect of this will be to do away with the distinction between direct taxes and duties, imposts and excises. It

he is liable for the damages he inﬂicts. The exception is that, where the injury is caused b competition in trade, or the lawful exercise

will, of course,

Criminal Law.

‘rom. The inﬂuence of Social and Economic Ideals on the Law of Malicious Torts." By Gordon Stoner. 8 Michigan Law Review 468 (Apr.). “The courts of this country are coming to adopt the view that the answer to the ues tion, May one, without incurring liability, exercise what has hitherto been regarded as a right in such a manner as to cause loss or damage to another? depends largely on the reasonableness of the purpose for which he exercises it. The most certain way of avoid ing diﬂiculty and conﬂict in cases of this sort is the adoption of the rule that where one is injured or damaged by the act of another he is entitled to be recompensed therefor,

unless the said damage is caused b the exer cise of an absolute right of the inﬁictor or unless the purpose sought to be accomplished by such act justifies it, i. 0., is reasonable. This rule or an approach to it has been ado ted in some of the recent cases. Judge San rn in his dissenting opinion in Passaic Print Works v. Walker Dry Goods Company, says, ‘The general rule is that, whenever one injures

ermit a direct tax upon land

of, a right which the inﬂictor has, then the

by the federal government under the rule of uniformity. I “If the amendments are submitted in the foregoing form, able and patriotic men will be found on both sides. But whether one is for or against the amendment in the form sug gested above, the issue will be a clear one. We will cure an ambiguity in the way it should be cured—by going back to the clauses in question and making them mean what we want. . . . “The phrase ‘direct taxes’ is confessedly blind. . . . The practical settlement of the words ‘by a species of arbitration,’ which Hamilton advocated, has been overturned by the Pollock decision. A zone has been sub stituted for a boundary line. The accredited national leaders of both political parties ask the people to cure this trouble; but shall we cure a. vague and ambiguous clause by a vague and ambiguous amendment? Are we

injury 15 justiﬁable, and no damages can be recovered. But where such an injury is inﬂicted, the presumption always is that the rule, and not the exception, applies, and, if the inﬂictor would justify, he must show that he falls within the exception.’ In this statement Judge Sanborn approaches a state ment of the rule suggested as a way out of the difficulty. It should not be conﬁned to injuries to one's ‘business, profession, or occu

pation,’ but extended so as to embrace injuries to any right, includin what Mr. Terry de nominates ‘the right 0 pecuniary condition.‘ An adoption of this rule, with the courts determining the reasonableness of the act causing the injury by comparing its effect on society with the effect of the injury thereby caused, would remove many of the difficulties in the law of malicious torts and would un doubtedly secure more just results in cases involving this law."