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 The Green Bag

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too little." And Professor Burgess's opinion that "there is full constitutional warrant for the construction and presentation of regular bills and projects of law to Congress by the President," is cited with approval. It would be expected that the book would open with a discussion of the federal execu tive, but the earlier chapters treat of the growth of the office of state executive from Colonial times. The purpose in placing the state executive ﬁrst is historical. Its functions were deﬁned by state constitutions before the federal constitutional convention.

Moreover,

the resemblance between the state and federal executive powers is so marked that the devel opment of the latter may be seen to have been inﬂuenced by that of the former. In a book pursuing the historical method to such an extent, the evolution of the Presidential oﬁice in the constitutional convention might well have received treatment. In this respect the authors fail to ﬁll in an important gap. They say at the outset, “The American executive is not the successor of the British crown." This may refer to the state execu tive primarily, but appears to dispute Sir Henry Maine's contention (“Popular Govern ment,” Essay IV) that the powers of the

President are copied after those of George III. The historical question thus raised is ineffectually met by a quotation from the Federalist.

As a matter of fact, "the federal

Constitution sets the example of a strong and simple organization of the executive power" (p. 44) and Sir Henry Maine is undoubtedly right when he says, "The original of the President of the United States is manifestly a treaty-making king, and a king actively inﬂuencing the executive government." There was nothing in the state executive to furnish a precedent for the treaty-making power exercised by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Neither was there a precedent for the power of ap pointing all the highest officials, as the states have generally provided for the election of their chief officers. Whether the depriva tion of the ministers of state of seats in Con gress is due to the example of George III, who desired to govern the country himself, or to the inﬂuence of the doctrine of the separation of legislative and executive func tions, is debatable. It is undeniable, however,

that the federal executive is in come respects the direct descendant of the English crown. In most respects he is not, for the powers of the President were so limited by the Con

stitution that he could not grant privileges or franchises, he could not declare war or raise arms, he possessed no absolute'veto, he was made subject to impeachment, his pardon ing power did not include cases of impeach ment, and he was without power to adjourn Congress for disagreement. Sir Henry Maine's contention, therefore, requires qualiﬁcation. The President is only in certain respects the direct successor of the British long. For the most part, as Messrs. Finley and Sanderson do not take pains to show but as they imply, his powers are patterned after those of the state executive. But their assertion that "the American executive is not the successor of the British crown," so far as it applies to the President, would have to be modiﬁed. To a certain extent he is. In its application to the state executive it also requires slight qualiﬁcation. The powers of the Governors are based upon those of the Colonial Gov ernors, but ultimately such powers could ﬁnd their prototype only in the crown, and the statement can hold true only as a denial of direct succession. To turn from the powers of the executive to the general powers distributed under the Constitution, Mr. Hughes has devoted a small book to an elucidation of the textof the federal Constitution, intended primarily for popular circulation and especially for the education of the youth of the land in the principles of the government under which they live. It makes no pretension to being anything more, and is written in a clear, non-technical style,

well adapted to the execution of its didactic purpose. In matters not requiring analytical treatment or a wide knowledge of constitu tional law the book apears to be well informed and correct, its method being expository rather than analytical. In some other respects, however, it has defects the influence of which may be positively harmful, The writer is an adherent of the state's rights theory. As his book is written with a simple aim, and its title, "The Philosophy of the Federal Constitution," suggests a less matterof-fact treatment than that which he evidently had in view, it would have been better had be suppressed opinions which seem too strongly partisan and somewhat out of place. His argument that the federal government is simply an agent of the state governments, and that the principal has power under the Con stitution to revoke this agency at any time, is an assertion of the secession doctrine in an extreme form which will create astonish