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The Green Bag

international good-fellowship demand that nations come to an agreement as to means

and methods for avoiding misinterpretation. . . “The new German treaties, with the ex

ce tion of that with Russia, provide for ar 'tration of difficulties over the interpre tation or application of the tariﬁ or of most favored-nation treatment. Most of the others of the recent grou of central European treaties contain simi r provisions." "The Abolition of the House of Lords." By President W. DeWitt Hyde. Outlook, v. 93, p. 866 (Dec. 18). The author uses the phrase "House of Lords" as a metaphor for the “privileged" class of leaders of corporate industry, in the United States, and expresses his views on

the tariﬁ. "The only way by which President Taft can hope to maintain his party in power is to take advantage of the po ular support that such a movement woul’d have and abolish once for all the method of tariﬂ making which has created and maintains our present House of Lords." Taxation. "The Constitutionality of the United States Corporation Tax." By Prof. Frank J. Goodnow. 9 Columbia Law Review 649 (Dec.).

From an examination of the Pollock cases (157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601), the writer reaches the conclusion that— “The corporation tax law is. . . not uncon stitutional as imposing an unapportioned direct tax, except in so far as it imposes a tax on income derived from property, and the unconstitutionality of this portion of the law will not have the result of causing the whole law to be unconstitutional." On the question of uniformity, Prof. Goodnow’s carefull reached conclusion is:— “It may . . . safe y be said that the corpora tion ‘tax is not unconstitutional because violative of the uniformity clause and that,

on that account and because not a direct tax, in so far as it imposes a tax on the income

derived from business, it is not forbidden by the express provisions of the Constitution limiting the taxing powers of Con ss." As to the taxing powers of ongress in

of the powers of the states. It has in Knowl ton v. Moore (178 U. S. 41), recognized the right of the United States to impose a tax on inheritances, which it has regarded as the eﬁects of the exercise of the power of the state to regulate inheritances, while Congress has without opposition and for a long time, probably because of the decision in the meme Tax Cases (5 Wall. 462), imposed a

special excise tax on the holders of state licenses to, sell liquor, notwithstanding the Supreme Court has denied the right of the states to tax steamboats licensed by the United States to use the navi ble waters of the United States. Indee, the only cases where the Supreme Court has interfered to

rotect the states a

'nst the exercise

of t e taxing power of n have been in the cases of the salaries of state officers, the evidences of indebtedness of the states and their local co rations, and the property of the states an their local corporations, where in its opinion that property is used for a necessary purpose of state government, and liquor license bonds required under a state liquor license law. “The Supreme Court may not thus be said to have been active in the defense of the powers of the states against Congressional action. It is therefore very doubtful if it will regard the corporation tax law as un constitutional because interfering with or hampering the exercise of one of the powers which by our system of federal government are recognized as belonging to the states. "The answer to the question as to the oonstitutionalit of the United States corpora tion tax woul seem then to be that it is constitutional except in so far as it imposes a tax on income derived from property. Except as to that portion of it, it is not a direct tax and therefore need not be appor tioned among the states. It is uniform throughout the United States, and it would appear not to violate the obligation of Con gress, arising out of the theo of federal government, not to interfere wit the powers of the states." Title by Discovery. “Arctic Exploration and International Law." By Prof. James Brown Scott. 3 American journal of Inter national Law 928 (Oct.).

relation to the rights of the states, the author

says :-— “The only reason for holding that the United States may not tax a corporate franchise granted by a state is to be found in the fact that because the power to tax is the power to destroy, the United States may in this way destroy one of the state’s powers. "In their determination as to the powers of the states to tax the effects or results of the exercise by the United States of its powers the state courts have been governed by this idea. They have therefore held that the states may not tax letters atent or copy rights issued by the United tates. But the Supreme Court of the United States has not up to the present time been equally regardful

"There is great difficulty in applying the present theory and practice 0 iscovery and occupation to the Arctic regions even supposing that the general principles can be considered as universally accepted, for Arctic expeditions are usually voyages of discovery in which there is no present or future intent to annex the territory actually discovered. They are undertaken with a scientiﬁc, not

with a political intent, although it would be eminently proper for an ex dition to be ﬁtted out under the control 0 a state official for the express purpose of annexing any and all lands to be discovered. Su posing that Dr. Cook reached the North Po e, it is difficult to see how the United States acquires any