Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 22.pdf/138

 126 "Proceeding from a false

that the rule of Hadley v.

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axendale applies

to actions ex delicta, the courts have

ound

themselves confronted with the fact that in most cases its application would result in absurdity or ﬂa nt injustice. But instead of testin the ru e for possible error they have exerciser? their ingenuity in extending‘ the scope of reasonable contemplation of injury, or in ﬁnding circumstances which could be tortured into und for an exception, and having thus evaded the rule for the instant case and vindicated justice at the expense of logic, have hastened to square themselves with the assumedly orthodox authority by reiterating and asseverating the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale as a general proposi tion." Property and Contract. “Impairment of the Obligation of Contract by State Judicial Decisions." By W. F. Dodd. 4 Illinois Law Review 327 (Dec.). The second and ﬁnal instalment of a learned and comprehensive analysis of the subject (see also 21 Green Bag 634). "The accepted doctrine and the one uni formly acted upon for many years is, that the federal Supreme Court will not review by writ of error state decisions impairing the obligation of contracts, unless such decisions give eﬂect to some legislation impairing contracts. Citizens of different states may bring their actions in the federal courts and obtain relief from state decisions impairing contracts, under the rules of Gel cke v. Dubuque (1 Wall. 175) and Hotel ompany v. Jones (193 U. S. 532); yet in precisely the same cases, if the parties are citizens of the same state they have no relief from such state decisions. . . . "A. . . lo "cal view would be for the court to hold a ju icial decision to be a ‘law’ in the technical sense, but the present attitude is

better for the court, because it permits the Supreme Court to take or refuse 'urisdiction as it pleases, while the holding o a decision to be a 'law' would operate to give an appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right from state decisions impairing the obligation of contracts. . . . "The question as to the extent to which the federal courts will protect contract and property rights from impairment by state Judicial decisions is really in larger part a question as to how far the federal courts will protect rights acquired. under a state law subsequently declared unconstitutional— that is, as to the effect given by the federal courts to state decisions declaring state statutes unconstitutional. As has already been in dicated, state judicial decisions may impair property or contract rights either (I) by olding unconstitutional a state statute under which such rights have been acquired, or (‘2) by reversing a former decision upon the faith of which contract rights have accrued and this reversal may be one changing com mon-law principles or altering the interpre

tation of a law admittedly valid, or one holding a law unconstitutional when similar laws had previously been held valid, and rights had been acquired upon the faith of the earlier decision. It may be said that most of the cases of the character under discussion, which have come into the federal courts, have involved rights claimed under

state laws subsequently declared invalid by state courts." "The Commodities Clauses: Are They Ordinances of Property, or Regulations of Commerce?" By Edward L. Andrews. 9 Columbia Law Review 677 (Dec.). "Once Congress reaches out to conditions existing beyond the body of commerce, its legal dilﬁculties begin. Congress cannot impinge upon the state impen'um over prop erty rights, or over the legal conditions of production. Such enactments really amount to legislative evasions of the duty to regulate commerce—in the constitutional meaning of regulation—by the legal administration of commerce in the concrete. “The treatment of the ownershi of goods transported as an element of regu tion was a conception foreign to the minds of the framers of the Constitution. As such con ception involves the inclusion of control over property rights, it is logically alien to regula tion of commerce. By assigning any inter ference with the freedom of markets for property as the boundary between the inter state commerce power and the property power, the harmonious action of both powers is the necessary resultant. No trespass upon such property rights is admissible upon the theo that commerce may be ultimately bene ted. Such a theory would render the state powers mere implements for the further ance of federal economic theory and nullify the division of our governmental powers.’ Race Discrimination. See Status. Real Property. “Hints on Examination of Real Estate Titles." By William A. Gretzinger, of the Philadelphia bar. 2 Lawyer and Banker 199 (Dec.). "These few hints will suﬁice to show how utterly insuﬂicient and misleading are the ordinary abstracts of title upon which so many purchasers rely; how impossible it is that the records should give completely the information regarding the true state of titles; and how im rtant that one who would examine titles should not only have some knowledge of law, but should make his in vestigations with his mind awake to all the numerous and diversiﬁed circumstances which may affect the title, even in the cases which, upon the surface, appear the simplest." "The New York Test of Vested Remain ders." By S. C. Huntington. 9 Columbia Law Review 687 (Dec.). “If Bench and Bar concur in my construc tion of sections 13 and 29, two changes would seem to be proper. Section 41 of the